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CORPORATE CHOICE OF LAW — A 
COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND EUROPEAN SYSTEMS AND A 
PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN 
DIRECTIVE 
Christian Kersting*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
OREIGN corporations are corporations that are incorpo-
rated in another jurisdiction.1  A pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion is a corporation that is incorporated in another juris-
diction but has no significant contacts with that other jurisdic-
tion.2  This creates specific problems as to the applicable law, 
protection of shareholders and third parties, a state’s interest in 
legislating, etc.  These questions are of special importance to 
jurisdictions that, as a general rule, apply the law of the state of 
incorporation to a corporation because that rule enables such 
entities to freely choose the law applicable to them.  Whereas 
the jurisdictions in the U.S. have universally adopted this ap-
proach, the situation in the European Community (“EC”) is un-
clear.3  Until recently, it was widely believed that the laws of 
  
 * Head of Unit (Accounting and Taxation), Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and Tax Law, Munich; LL.M. 2002 Yale 
Law School, Dr. iur. (J.S.D.) 2000 University of Bonn.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Roberta Romano, Yale Law School, for her advice and for 
valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. CAL. CORP . CODE § 171 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 371(a) (2001). 
 2. Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., 844 S.W.2d 56, 61 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); 
Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857 (1982); 
Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 161–62 (1955).  
Pseudo-foreign corporations are also referred to as “tramp-corporations.”  
Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ohio 1984); 
Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d 571, 573 (Okla. 1943); 36 AM. JUR. 
2D Foreign Corporations §§ 82, 121 (2001); William L. M. Reese & Edmund M. 
Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Im-
pact of Full Faith and Credit , 58 COLUM . L. REV. 1118, 1125–26 (1958). 
 3. See infra Part V.A. 
F 
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the EC Member States governed that conflict of laws issue,4 and 
many Member States still apply the law of the jurisdiction 
where the company’s “real seat” is located.5  But the recent Cen-
tros decision of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)6 has cast 
doubt on this belief and led many commentators to believe that 
the application of the so-called “place of incorporation theory” is 
mandated by European law.7 
This possible convergence of U.S. and EC law makes a com-
parison between both systems an interesting undertaking, es-
pecially because of the “federal” structure of both U.S. and EC 
company law.8  This Article tries to give an overview of the 
treatment of pseudo-foreign corporations in U.S. corporate law, 
to uncover differences in viewpoint between U.S. and European 
law, to examine the suitability of U.S. solutions for European 
law, and to propose legislative changes to European law. 
II. APPLICABLE LAW IN THE U.S. — INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE 
Company law in the U.S. is state law.9  Since there are no 
pertinent federal rules on conflict of laws, state law also gov-
erns a conflicts situation in corporate law.10  Unlike Europe, 
however, the states in the U.S. have a uniform collision rule 
and apply the laws of the state of incorporation to a foreign cor-
poration.11 
  
 4. Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, [1988] E.C.R. 5483 
(holding that such a treatment of pseudo-foreign corporations did not violate 
Article 43 [ex 52] and Article 48 [ex 58] of the European Community Treaty). 
 5. For example France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, 
and Greece.  See infra note 205. 
 6. Case C–212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] 
E.C.R. I–1459. 
 7. See infra note 206. 
 8. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Back to the Future? From “Centros” to the 
“Überlagerungstheorie,” in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR OTTO SANDROCK 70, 149 (Klaus 
Peter Berger et al. eds., 2000). 
 9. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ , CORPORATION LAW §§ 1.1, 1.2 (2000). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)  OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 104 (1971) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. 
 11. The internal affairs rule also involves a “forum selection aspect.” See 
infra Part III.B. Cf. generally MATTHIAS KORNER, DAS KOLLISIONSRECHT DER 
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA  (1989). 
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A. Content of the Internal Affairs Rule 
The so-called “internal affairs rule” is replicated by the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”), which 
provides: 
§302.  Other Issues with respect to Powers and Liabilities of a 
Corporation 
  (1) Issues involving the rights and liabilities of a corpora-
tion, other than those dealt with in §301, are determined by 
the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular 
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence 
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
  (2) The local law of the state of incorporation will be ap-
plied to determine such issues, except in the unusual case 
where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state 
has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be 
applied. 12  
The rationale for the internal affairs rule is that corporations 
should not be faced with conflicting demands regarding “mat-
ters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corpo-
ration, and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”13 
The U.S. Supreme Court has further emphasized the impor-
tance of the fact that “a corporation — except in the rarest 
situations — is organized under, and governed by, the law of a 
  
 12. RESTATEMENT § 302.  See also REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
15.05(c); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337, 1339 n.1 (N.J. 1985); 
Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Associates, Architects and Planners, Inc., 334 
S.E.2d 308, 310 (Ga. 1985); Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252, 255–56 (D.N.J. 
1988); Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 
U.S. 885 (1962); Labovitz v. Washington Times Corp., 900 F. Supp. 500, 503 
(D.D.C. 1995), McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214–219 (Del. 1987); 
Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991); 36 AM. JUR. 2D For-
eign Corporations § 78 (2001). 
 13. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).  See also RESTATEMENT 
§ 302 cmts. b, e (1971).  The rule “does not apply where the rights of third 
parties external to the corporation are at issue.”  RESTATEMENT § 301; Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. Camhi, 861 F. Supp. 1121, 1126 (D. Conn. 1994). However, 
the rule nevertheless applies as far as limited liability is concerned, although 
this undoubtedly involves the rights of third parties external to the corpora-
tion.  But see cases cited infra note 30.  See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, 
Personal Liability of Stockholder, Officer or Agent for Debt of Foreign Corpora-
tion Doing Business in the State, 27 A.L.R.4th 387 (1984). 
File: Kersting Base  Macro F2.doc Created on:  10/30/2002 7:42 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:25 PM 
4 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:1 
single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State 
[sic] of its incorporation.”14  
Contrary to the European perception of the American inter-
nal affairs rule as absolute, the Restatement calls for exceptions 
in unusual cases.15  Moreover, the Supreme Court has put em-
phasis not on the application of the internal affairs rule, but on 
its effect that only the law of one jurisdiction applies,16 thus 
leaving room for other choice of law rules that “except in the 
rarest of situations” have the same effect.17  In fact, courts have 
in some cases — even absent a special outreach statute — ap-
plied forum law to the internal affairs of foreign corporations.18  
In Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company v. Johnson, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in spite of 
the internal affairs rule, the law of the forum should be applied 
in cases in which the only contact point with the incorporating 
state is the “naked fact of incorporation,” and neither the corpo-
ration’s charter nor the statutory law of the state of incorpora-
tion are applicable.19  In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, the 
  
 14. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) (em-
phasis added). Cf. Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation 
on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806, 814–15 (1971) (sug-
gesting that cases decided by the Supreme Court in this area “appear to have 
been decided on the ground that the rights and obligatons of members should 
be uniform regardless of their place of residence”).  Delaware courts conclude 
that this must lead to the application of the internal affairs rule.  See Rosen-
miller, 607 A.2d at 468.  However, this is not a cogent argument.  As long as 
only the law of one jurisdiction applies, there is no danger of conflicting de-
mands. Yet, like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Delaware Supreme Court made 
an exception for the “rarest situations.”  McDermott, 531 A.2d. at 217. 
 15. See Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., 844 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 16. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, does not make this fine dis-
tinction.  See supra note 14. 
 17. For example, the real seat theory would meet this requirement because 
a company can only have one real seat.  See infra text accompanying note 34.  
However, the counter-argument could be made that courts could entertain 
different opinions as to where the real seat actually is, whereas such differ-
ences could not exist as to the place of incorporation.  Nevertheless, this prob-
lem could be solved by instituting procedural safeguards.  See infra Part 
VI.C.2. 
 18. Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The Proper 
Law of a Corporation, 44 BUS . LAW . 693, 699–700 (1989). 
 19. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321. (5th 
Cir. 1959).  The court noted, however, that this statement is obiter dictum and 
not necessary for the disposition of the case.  Id. at 322.  See also Note, Con-
flict of Laws — Duty of Director of Foreign Corporation to Shareholder Held to 
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New Jersey Supreme Court applied New Jersey law rather than 
New York law to determine directors’ liability, because New 
Jersey had more significant relationships to the parties and 
transactions than New York, and the parties agreed that New 
Jersey law should apply.20  The case was followed by a federal 
district court in New Jersey in In re ORFA Securities Litiga-
tion.21   
These cases all involved directors’ or officers’ liability, which 
means that the presumption of the internal affairs rule can be 
overcome under certain circumstances,22 but the exceptions to 
the internal affairs rule are not limited to that fact pattern.  In 
Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Modell, the Ohio Supreme 
Court applied Ohio law to a voting agreement between share-
holders of a Delaware corporation.23  In Jefferson Industrial 
Bank v. First Golden Bancorporation, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals applied Colorado law to a Delaware corporation with 
respect to the shareholders’ rights to inspect the books of the 
corporation.24  In Greenspun v. Lindley, a case involving a Mas-
sachusetts business trust, the New York Court of Appeals re-
jected in dictum any automatic application of the internal af-
fairs doctrine in cases in which there were significant contacts 
  
be Governed by Law of Forum when Corporate Activity Centers in Forum, 108 
U. PA. L. REV. 742 (1960). 
 20. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981). How-
ever, the trial court found no difference between New York and New Jersey 
law.  Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 392 A.2d 1233, 1242 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1978). 
 21. In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987). 
 22. In cases of directors’ liability, “[t]he presumption associated with the 
internal affairs doctrine can be overcome: (1) if the expectations of the parties 
involved merit the application of other law; (2) in the name of ‘certainty’; (3) if 
the ‘ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied’ justify 
the use of another jurisdiction’s law.”  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gladstone, 
895 F. Supp. 356, 363 (D. Mass. 1995) (negative treatment indicated in 
F.D.I.C. v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2000)); Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151, 153–54 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 23. Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Modell,  473 N.E.2d 807, 811 (Ohio 
1984) (Brown & Holmes, JJ., dissenting on grounds that majority mistakenly 
relied on notions of contract law, although corporate law was at issue). See 
RESTATEMENT § 305. 
 24. Jefferson Industrial Bank v. First Golden Bancorporation, 762 P.2d 
768, 770 (Colo. App. 1988). The Colorado statute was not an outreach statute. 
It was applied on conflict of laws grounds with reference to RESTATEMENT          
§ 304 cmt. d.  Id. at 769.  Cf. infra note 47. 
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with New York that called for the application of New York 
law.25  The court expressly left open which law it would apply in 
such cases and what effect it would give to a choice of law 
agreement between the parties.26  In the subsequent cases 
Skolnik v. Rose and Rottenberg v. Pfeiffer, the courts referred to 
this decision but held that the New York contacts were insuffi-
cient to warrant the application of New York law.27  In Norlin 
Corporation v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,28 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit could have pursued the Greenspun approach 
but instead applied New York law in the mistaken belief that a 
false conflict existed.29  All these cases indicate that New York 
is open to making exceptions to the internal affairs rule. 
All in all, under common law, the internal affairs rule is not 
cast in stone but leaves room for flexible solutions and excep-
tions.  On the other hand, courts do not go so far as to deny a 
foreign company’s corporate existence for lack of complying with 
the local rules of incorporation,30 but rather apply the lex incor-
porationis, even under unusual circumstances.31 
B. The Internal Affairs Rule, a Constitutional Requirement?  
The extent to which the internal affairs rule is mandated by 
the U.S. Constitution is unclear.32  In Edgar v. MITE and CTS 
  
 25. Greenspun v. Lindley, 330 N.E.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. 1975). 
 26. Id.   
 27. Skolnik v. Rose, 434 N.E.2d 251, 252 (N.Y. 1975); Rottenberg v. Pfeif-
fer, 398 N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 1977). 
 28. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 262–64 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 29. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 212–15 (Del. 1987); Beveridge, 
supra note 18, at 700. 
 30. After some uncertainty, the leading case is now Demarest v. Grant, 28 
N.E. 645 (N.Y. 1891).  See also Medley Harwoods, Inc. v. Novy, 346 So.2d 
1224, 1226 (Fla. App. 1977); National Ass'n of Credit Mgmt. v. Burke, 645 
P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. App. 1982); Latty, supra note 2, at 145–48.  However, 
the corporate entity has been disregarded in older cases.  See, e.g., Cleaton v. 
Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345, 354–55, 1892 WL 1812 *5 (Mo. App. 1892); Hill v. 
Beach, 12 N.J. Eq. 31, 35–36, 1858 WL 4982, *5 (Ch. 1858). See also Nadel, 
supra note 13.  For the non-recognition of corporate existence under the real 
seat theory, see infra Part V.A. 
 31. For further detail, see John P. Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of 
Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 15–24 (1984). 
 32. For a comprehensive overview of the earlier constitutional ramifica-
tions, see Stanley A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Pol-
icy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 443–60 (1968). 
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Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the U.S. Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of only one jurisdiction’s law apply-
ing to the internal affairs of a corporation.33  This objective is 
fully achieved by the internal affairs doctrine, but also by the 
“real seat theory,”34 and one could even argue that as long as a 
particular internal affair is not subjected to two different laws, 
the objective is met.35 
In McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that the Commerce Clause, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
required the application of the internal affairs doctrine, but still 
left a loophole for the “rarest situations.”36  Yet the case is not 
binding precedent on this matter, because first, the Delaware 
Supreme Court does not have the authority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court on constitutional issues, and second, the case was moot.37  
Thus, absent an express U.S. Supreme Court decision, the 
constitutional question remains unclear.38 
Still, it is noteworthy that the system only works reasonably 
well in avoiding conflicting demands on corporations because all 
states uniformly apply the internal affairs rule.39  If one state 
applied the real seat theory as its choice of law rule, a Delaware 
  
 33. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 34. The “real seat theory” applies the law of the state in which the com-
pany has its “real seat.”  See infra Part V.A. and supra note 17. 
 35. Horowitz, supra note 14, at 819 (explicitly recognizing that the “single 
law” principle does not mean that the U.S. Constitution mandated the inter-
nal affairs rule as the corporate choice of law rule). 
 36. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d. 206, 216–219 (Del. 1987). 
 37. See Beveridge, supra note 18, at 701, 709, 711. 
 38. For further discussion of the constitutional aspects, see Beveridge, 
supra note 18, at 701, 709–714; Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Cor-
porate Laws: The United States, the European Community and the Race to 
Laxity, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (1994); Hartwin Bungert, Equal 
Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny 
for a Quasi-Suspect Qualification, 59 MO. L. REV. 569 (1994); Richard M. Bux-
baum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987); Horowitz, supra note 14; Kozyris, 
supra note 31, at 30–35; Latty, supra note 2, at 162–66; Note, The Internal 
Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations for Its 
Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1490–96 (2002) (offering consti-
tutional explanations for the internal affairs doctrine). 
 39. Cf.  Practising Law Institute, PLI Order No. A4–4398, Oct. 1992, In-
ternational Commercial Agreements. 
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corporation having its headquarters in that state would be sub-
ject to the laws of two jurisdictions.  Therefore, the corporate 
choice of law rules must have federal constitutional implica-
tions for practical reasons: it may be up to the states to decide 
on the choice of law rule, but this choice can only be exercised 
uniformly.  Thus the states are “locked in,” save for the “rarest 
situations.”  A strong argument can be made, however, that 
pseudo-foreign corporations, even if their number is not insig-
nificant, present at least in a legal sense one of those rarest 
situations.  The law expects that corporations have the “most 
significant relationship with their state of incorporation.”40  If 
that expectation is frustrated, this constitutes in a legal sense 
“one of the rarest situations” or, in the words of the Restate-
ment, the “unusual case” in which another state has a more 
significant relationship.41  
C. Differences between Jurisdictions 
Why do the choice of law rules matter?  They matter because 
of the differences in substantive law.  Most jurisdictions go be-
yond pure enabling statutes that allow corporate founders to 
essentially draft “their statute” by exercising options to waive 
and to alter legal provisions in their charter or their by-laws, 
and provide for a certain number of mandatory rules designed 
to protect specific classes of people.42  
These mandatory rules differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
and include provisions on cumulative voting,43 the voting of 
shares in the parent company owned by a subsidiary,44 share-
  
 40. RESTATEMENT § 302 shows that the decisive issue in determining the 
applicable law is the “most significant relationship” and presumes the most 
significant relationship to be with the state of incorporation. 
 41. Id.  See also  infra note 178. 
 42. Blackburn, supra note 38, at 9–14. 
 43. CAL. CORP . CODE § 708 (West 1990).  See Kozyris, supra note 31, at 10 
n.31.  For a comparison of California and Delaware law in light of the Califor-
nia outreach statute, see Michael J. Halloran & Douglas L. Hammer, Section 
2115 of the New California General Corporation Law — The Application of 
California Corporation Law to Foreign Corporations, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1282, 
1295–1324 (1976). For a comparison of California, New York, and Delaware 
law in that respect, see J. Thomas Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-
Foreign Corporations — Trampling Upon the Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
85, 99–100 (1977). 
 44. See, e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d. 206 (Del. 1987); Norlin 
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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holders’ liability for obligations to employees,45 the procedure 
for removing directors,46 the inspection of corporate records,47 
etc.48  Unlike in Europe,49 the requirement of a minimum capi-
tal is no longer an issue in the U.S.50 
D. Jurisdiction and Service of Process 
Under U.S. law, jurisdiction is acquired by service of process, 
which is a prerequisite to the actual exercise of jurisdiction.51 
Without such service of process, a court may have subject-
matter jurisdiction but still lack personal jurisdiction.52  
Personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation — once ac-
quired by service of process — can be exercised only if the for-
eign corporation has “certain minimum contacts” with the fo-
rum state so “that the maintenance of the action does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”53  The 
mere residence or presence of an officer or agent of the corpora-
tion in the forum state is not in itself sufficient.54  Although 
constitutionally only minimum contacts are required, states are 
  
 45. Joncas v. Krueger, 213 N.W.2d. 1, 2 (Wis. 1973). 
 46. See Kozyris, supra note 31, at 11 (discussing the Bendix and Martin 
Marietta takeover struggle). 
 47. Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (4th App. Dist. 1983); 
Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d 571, 573 (Okla. 1943). See also K. 
M. Potraker, Annotation, Stockholder’s Right to Inspect Books and Records of 
Foreign Corporation, 19 A.L.R.3d 869 (1968).  It should be noted, however, 
that many cases cited by Potraker, especially the older ones, have been de-
cided on procedural grounds of (lacking) jurisdiction, not on conflict of laws 
grounds.  Id. at 873–74. 
 48. See Beveridge, supra note 18, at 703–09; Kozyris, supra note 31, at 9. 
 49. See infra Part V .E.2. 
 50. But see Cleaton v. Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345, 349–53, 1892 WL 1812 *3–
4 (1892). 
 51. Napier v. Hawthorn Books, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 576, 579 (E.D. Mich. 
1978). 
 52. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 4 (1990). 
 53. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations §§ 442, 448 (2001); Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Napier, 449 F. Supp. at 579. See 
also Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Del. 1988) (Delaware having 
jurisdiction over an Ohio parent corporation of a Delaware subsidiary and 
jurisdiction over the non-resident directors of the subsidiary). 
 54. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 122 
(1927); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 452 (2001). 
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free to require more than that.55  In some states, therefore, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation de-
pends on whether the corporation “does business” in the forum 
state.56  The factors that determine this question are whether 
the corporation has an office in the forum state, has solicited 
business there, or has bank accounts or employees in the 
state.57  
As to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts originally applied the 
internal affairs rule and did not exercise jurisdiction over the 
internal affairs of a foreign company.58 The general rule today is 
that “a court will exercise jurisdiction over an action involving 
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation unless it is an inap-
propriate or an inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.”59  
This jurisdiction extends to removing the officers of a pseudo-
foreign corporation or appointing receivers, the liquidation of 
the corporation, the inspection of its books,60 and other meas-
ures.61 
III. EFFECTS 
As a result of the internal affairs rule, founders can choose 
the law they want to apply to their future corporation, and cor-
porations can change the law that applies to them by reincorpo-
rating in another state.  In other words, the internal affairs rule 
allows founders and corporations to “go shopping” for the law 
they think most suitable. 
  
 55. Elliot v. U.S. Steel Export Co., 186 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1960); 36 
AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations §§ 446, 451 (2001). The law of the forum 
state determines personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.  Photo-
active Prod., Inc. v. AL-OR Int’l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 56. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Corp. Co. of Del., 2 N.W.2d 372, 389 
(Iowa 1942); Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427 (N.Y. 1964); 36 AM. JUR. 
2D, Foreign Corporations, §§ 448, 451 (2001). 
 57. Photoactive Prod., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 288; 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corpo-
rations § 451 (2001).  For a differentiation between general and special juris-
diction, see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985); 
Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d at 1117; infra note 98. 
 58. See Beveridge, supra note 18, at 696–97; Latty, supra note 2, at 144. 
 59. RESTATEMENT § 313; State ex rel . Weede, 2 N.W.2d at 390. 
 60. See Potraker, supra note 47. 
 61. Latty, supra note 2, at 144 nn.22–23 (citing, inter alia,  State ex rel. 
Wurdeman v. Reynolds, 204 S.W. 1093 (Mo. 1918)).  See also State ex rel. 
Wurdeman, 204 S.W. at 1096–97; Aston v. O’Carrol, 66 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 
1946); Potter v. Victor Page Motor Corp., 300 F. 885, 887 (D. Conn. 1924). 
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A. Delaware Effect 
The option to shop for corporate charters has created a com-
petition for charters among the states — the so-called Delaware 
Effect.  States profit from incorporations under their law and 
therefore try to attract re-incorporations by repeatedly adapting 
their laws.62  In Europe, the Delaware Effect is widely regarded 
with suspicion, and many commentators fear a “race to the bot-
tom.”63  In the U.S., there has been much debate on whether 
this effect is beneficial or detrimental to shareholders.64 The 
debate focused mainly on re-incorporations initiated by man-
agement and not on the founders’ initial decision of where to 
incorporate, because only in the former case is it possible that 
management is trying to choose a law that favors itself over the 
shareholders.65  The argument in support of the Delaware Effect 
was that decisions by management that decrease shareholder 
value would result in a takeover and that this would either dis-
courage managerial opportunism or at least rectify the situa-
tion.  Supported by empirical studies, the opinion that the 
Delaware Effect benefits shareholders seems to have prevailed 
in the U.S.66 At the very least, it can be confidently said that the 
  
 62. See Kaplan, supra note 32, at 433–37; John Hugh Newman, The 
Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 119, 119 (1976). 
With respect to the California outreach statute, see Oldham, supra note 43, at 
104–110. See also Hanno Merkt, Das Europäische Gesellschaftsrecht und die 
Idee des “Wettbewerbs der Gesetzgeber in Europa”, RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ], 59 (1995), 545 
(549–554); Otto Sandrock, Ein amerikanisches Lehrstück für das 
Kollisionsrecht der Kapitalgesellschaften, RABELSZ 42 (1978), 227 (233–37). 
 63. See infra note 214. 
 64. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (race to the bottom); Ralph K. Win-
ter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (race to the top).  See also Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 
U.S. 517, 559 nn.36–37 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Blackburn, supra 
note 38, at 57–59; Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal 
Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961 (2001); Daniel R. Fischel, 
The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 913 (1982) (arguing that Dela-
ware law is detrimental to shareholders).   
 65. See sources cited supra note 64. 
 66. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 503, 505 (1998); Roberta Romano, 
Competition for State Corporate Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 364, 367 (1998); Roberta Romano, The State Compe-
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Delaware Effect does not produce devastating results for the 
economy. 
B. Interests of Individual States 
No matter what the choice of law rule is, the host state has 
an interest in obtaining information on the business activity of 
foreign corporations within its borders.  A corporation as “an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law,”67 i.e., a legal fiction, needs to be identifiable 
and reachable.  Third parties and the state must be able to find 
out where the corporation is incorporated,68 who the directors 
are, who is authorized to contract on behalf of the corporation, 
etc.  In the context of the internal affairs rule, this is also neces-
sary in order to determine the applicable law.  Another related 
point is that the forum state must be able to serve process on 
and exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that does 
business within its borders.69 
The founders’ or the corporation’s freedom to choose the ap-
plicable law can lead to situations in which a court is confronted 
with a lex incorporationis applicable to the internal affairs of a 
foreign corporation that is contrary to the public policy of the 
forum state.70 The question then arises whether the court nev-
ertheless has to respect the internal affairs rule or whether it 
can disregard the foreign law and at least partially apply forum 
law.71 
  
tition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).  Cf. Merkt, 
supra note 62, at 547. For new tendencies, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
& Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competi-
tion, 87 VA. L. REV. 111 (2001); William J. Carney, The Political Economy of 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Choi & 
Guzman, supra note 64. 
 67. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).  
See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 587 (1839). 
 68. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 40–41, 41 n.6, 41 
nn.7–8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1974). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See, e.g., Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (4th App. 
Dist. 1983) (public policy of California to allow inspection of books without 
“proper-purpose” restriction); German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 109 N.E. 
875, 877 (N.Y. 1915). 
 71. See Latty, supra note 2, at 160. 
File: Kersting Base  Macro F2.doc Created on: 10/30/2002 7:42 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:25 PM 
2002] CORPORATE CHOICE OF LAW 13 
C. Pseudo-foreign Corporations 
Another effect is the existence of so-called pseudo-foreign cor-
porations,72 which exacerbates the problems described above.  
First, a state has an important interest in obtaining informa-
tion on a foreign corporation that operates within its borders 
due to the need of making it identifiable and reachable both by 
its officials and third parties.73 If the corporation is technically 
foreign, but essentially domestic, the state’s interest is even 
greater because such a corporation affects the state’s and its 
citizens’ interests to the same extent as a domestic corporation.  
Thus, the host state will need to obtain the same information on 
this pseudo-foreign corporation that it has on domestic corpora-
tions.  The state would, for example,  want a pseudo-foreign 
corporation to publish annual account statements just like do-
mestic corporations, whereas it might be content with truly for-
eign corporations only providing information on where they are 
incorporated, their charter, and the persons authorized to bind 
them. 
Second, it might be justifiable for a host state to apply foreign 
law to a truly foreign corporation.  But once the foreign corpora-
tion has its headquarters and all or most of its shareholders in 
the host state where it also conducts (almost) all of its business, 
it is not really a foreign corporation, but a pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration.  States with less restrictive laws will still not mind ap-
plying foreign law, whereas a forum state whose laws pursue 
strong public policies will be more reluctant to apply foreign law 
to essentially domestic cases for several reasons.  
First, incorporating in another state, although all significant 
contacts are within the forum state, could be considered a 
fraudulent circumvention of the laws of the forum state.74  The 
  
 72. See supra note 2. 
 73. See supra Part III.B. 
 74. See Nadel, supra note 13, at 393–94.  But see Case C–212/97, Centros 
Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] E.C.R. I–1459, ¶ 27 (“That being 
so, the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company 
chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to 
him the least restrictive and to set up branches in other Member States can-
not, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.”); 2 JOSEPH H.  
BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 775 (1935) (“It is no fraud or 
evasion of the laws of a State for its citizens, intending to act only in their own 
State, to form themselves into a corporation under the laws of another 
State.”); Nadel, supra note 13, at 394–96. 
File: Kersting Base  Macro F2.doc Created on:  10/30/2002 7:42 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:25 PM 
14 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:1 
forum state could deny recognition to such an undertaking and 
either hold the pseudo-foreign corporation to be null and void75 
or superimpose its own law.76  
Second, applying forum law could be justified by a (constitu-
tional) necessity to treat like cases alike, unless substantial dif-
ferences require a different treatment.77 The forum state could 
argue that, except for the mere fact of foreign incorporation, 
there are no substantial differences between a pseudo-foreign 
corporation and a domestic corporation that would justify a dif-
ferent treatment.78  For example, the Iowa Supreme Court held 
in State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co.: 
It was conceived in Iowa, born in Delaware, and has lived its 
entire life in Iowa.  The foreignness of such a corporation has 
been spoken of as but a “metaphysical concept.”  Its existence 
in Delaware is an illusory mirage, more atmospheric, than 
real.  Under the circumstances it is, in actuality, more domes-
tic than foreign.79 
Third, at close inspection, the Delaware Effect could prove 
undemocratic, because it generally gives the people of Delaware 
a say in matters of corporate law that is by no means propor-
tional to their percentage of the U.S. population, nor to the 
voice they are meant to have by the U.S. Constitution.80  Theo-
  
 75. For example, disregard the corporate existence.  See Taylor v. Bran-
ham, 17 So. 552, 554 (Fla. 1895); Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282, 289 (1889); 
Cleaton v. Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345, 354–55, 1892 WL 1812 *5 (1892); Hill v. 
Beach, 12 N.J. Eq. 31, 35–36, 1858 WL 4982, *4 (Ch. 1858); 36 AM. JUR. 2D 
Foreign Corporations § 412 (2001).  See also supra note 30 and infra Part V.A. 
 76. This is essentially an “outreach issue.” See the common law exceptions 
to the internal affairs rule, supra Part II.A., and the outreach statutes, infra 
Part IV.B.  See also Latty, supra note 2, at 150; Sandrock, supra note 62, at 
248–50. 
 77. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 cl. 2; GRUNDGESETZ [German Constitu-
tion] art. 3.  
 78. State law often provides that foreign corporations do not enjoy greater 
privileges or more rights than domestic corporations.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 
10-2B-15.05(b) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33–924(b) (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 293–A:15.05(b) (1999); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1306 (McKinney’s 1986 
& Supp. 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1505(2) (2002).  Cf. Latty, supra note 2, 
at 156. 
 79. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Corp. Co. of Del., 2 N.W.2d 372, 386 
(Iowa 1942). 
 80. For instance, even if one takes into consideration that in the U.S. Sen-
ate the states are represented equally and not in proportion to their popula-
tion, the U.S. Constitution still only grants each state 1/50 of the votes in the 
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retically, this is legitimate because Delaware law is only an op-
tion for out-of-state corporations and not mandatory.  Moreover, 
corporate law and conflict of laws rules are state laws and 
Delaware merely exercises its right to legislate retained by it 
under the federal constitution.81  Yet, as a practical matter, this 
does not change the legal reality that Delaware’s influence on 
corporate law is disproportionate, especially since the other 
states cannot simply change their choice of law rules due to the 
constitutional lock-in effect described above.82  On the other 
hand, all that it takes to “democratize” the Delaware Effect is a 
federal legislative or judicial endorsement of the internal affairs 
rule, which can be seen in the Edgar and CTS cases — precisely 
within the constitutional lock-in effect just mentioned.  But this 
argumentation does not hold as far as pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions are concerned, because the application of the internal af-
fairs rule to pseudo-foreign corporations essentially accepts for-
eign state legislation on domestic issues, (i.e., it lets the incor-
porating state interfere with the “internal affairs” of the host 
state).83 
If for these reasons the host state wants to apply its local 
laws to a pseudo-foreign corporation, it is especially important 
that the host state be able to exercise jurisdiction over such a 
pseudo-foreign corporation because the state of incorporation 
might not be willing to enforce local84 public policy against its 
own law.85 
  
Senate. However, Delaware’s inescapable influence on corporate law is far 
greater than that and is probably closer to 50%, if not even higher.  
 81. “Reserved Powers to States. The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 82. See supra Part II.B. This distinguishes the internal affairs rule from 
other jurisdictional rules. Since corporations are not to be subjected to incon-
sistent demands, states seem to have to legislate uniformly on the corporate 
choice of law rules in order to avoid such inconsistencies. This means, for ex-
ample, that states cannot “defend themselves” by legislating differently from 
the intruding state and adopting a real seat rule. This restriction does not 
apply in the case of other jurisdictional rules. 
 83. Cf. RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). 
 84. I.e., foreign from the point of view of the state of incorporation. 
 85. This is not actually a “problem” in the case of a pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion.  Such a corporation by definition has the most substantial contacts with 
the forum state that regards it as pseudo-foreign and that forum state, there-
fore, has jurisdiction. Yet, the question arises how a third state would treat 
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IV. DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS 
In sum, pseudo-foreign corporations and foreign corporations 
present issues of disclosure, the collision of laws of the host 
state and the state of incorporation, and procedure.  The U.S. 
deals with these issues through state legislation, on the one 
hand, and federal constraints on such legislation on the other.  
The next section examines two types of state laws, qualification 
and outreach statutes, and discusses the federal or constitu-
tional restraints on such statutes.   
A. Qualification Statutes 
1. Nature 
Qualification statutes address the issues of disclosure and 
procedure.  They require a foreign corporation to register with a 
state before doing business within that state, i.e., before doing 
“intrastate business” as opposed to “interstate business.”86 
Registration means that the corporation has to provide the 
host state with certain information, and consent to its jurisdic-
tion.  Although the state laws differ in detail, a corporation gen-
erally has to state its name and state of incorporation,87 file a 
certificate issued by its home jurisdiction evidencing its corpo-
rate existence,88 and appoint an agent upon whom process may 
  
such a corporation, i.e., would New York treat a Delaware corporation that 
does all its business in and has all its contacts with California according to 
Delaware or California law? A case like that could come up in the context of a 
derivative suit brought in New York by a New York shareholder relying on 
provisions of California law. The answer is not clear because there are no 
precedents. Since New York’s own outreach statute would not apply, New 
York could turn to Delaware law and ignore the California outreach statute. 
On the other hand, since New York courts might want California courts to 
apply the New York outreach statute in the reverse case, they might be in-
clined to do the same for California. It could also be argued that, since no New 
York interests are involved, New York is bound by the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to apply the California outreach statute.  Compare infra Part IV.B.3.a., 
with sources cited infra note 168. 
 86. See, e.g., CAL. CORP . CODE § 2105(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8(b) § 371 (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1304(a) (McKinney’s 
1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 87. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a)(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 1304 (a)(1)–(3) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8(b)(1) § 371(b)(1) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 1304(b) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
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be served and provide the agent’s name and address.89  It must 
also indicate the address of its principal place of business out-
side the state;90 a recent statement of its assets and liabilities;91 
the business it proposes to do;92 a statement that it is allowed to 
pursue that business in its home jurisdiction;93 and, finally, pay 
a fee.94  The information given must be updated either periodi-
cally through annual or biannual reports95 or whenever a 
change occurs.96   
Concerning the procedural issue of service of process, the 
qualification statutes provide that a foreign corporation that 
wishes to qualify must designate an agent in the forum state 
upon whom process may be served.97 Designation of an agent 
not only facilitates the actual service of process, but it also “sub-
jects the foreign corporation to the general jurisdiction” of the 
host state in subject matters that the tenuous relation would 
otherwise not extend to.98  If process cannot be served on this 
agent, (for example, if the agent has resigned or cannot be 
found at the address provided), process may be served on the 
  
 89. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE  §§ 2105(a)(4), (b) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); 
N.Y. BUS . CORP. LAW  § 1304(a)(6)–(7), (b) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b)–(b)(2)(i) (2001). 
 90. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a)(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).  
 91. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b)(2)(ii) (2001). 
 92. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b)(2) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§ 1304(a)(4) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 93. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b)(2)(iii) (2001); N.Y. BUS. Corp. 
LAW §§ 1304(a)(4), 1305 (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002).  The requirement 
that a foreign corporation is entitled to do the business proposed to do abroad 
in its home jurisdiction seems to stem from decisions holding foreign corpora-
tions null and void if they are expressly chartered to do business exclusively 
abroad and are not entitled to engage in business in the state of incorporation.  
See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 587–88 (1839); Land Grant Ry. & 
Trust Co. v. Board Comm’rs Coffey County, 6 Kan. 245 (1870).  See also supra 
note 30.  
 94. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2106(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b) (2001). 
 95. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2117 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 374 (2001). 
 96. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2117(c) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1308, 1309, 1309–A (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 97. See supra note 89. 
 98. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 
892 (1988).  For the difference between “general” and “specific” jurisdiction, 
see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985); Sternberg 
v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1117 (Del. 1988).  See also supra note 57. 
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Secretary of State.99  In the case of a foreign corporation that 
has failed to qualify despite an obligation to do so, process may 
be served on the Secretary of State as well.100  The qualification 
statute thus facilitates the task both of prospective plaintiffs 
and the courts.  First, the need for qualification and qualifica-
tion itself demonstrate the existence of the “minimum contacts” 
of the foreign corporation with the forum required for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.101  Second, plaintiffs and courts are provided 
with a practical means of actually acquiring jurisdiction 
through an effective method of serving process that cannot be 
evaded by the corporation.102  Third, the statement required of a 
foreign corporation does not only include the name and address 
of the agent upon whom process may be served, but also pro-
vides plaintiffs and courts with information concerning the 
place of incorporation, and thus the applicable law according to 
the internal affairs rule, which can be important in determining 
who has authority to act for the  defendant foreign corporation.  
Moreover, it enables them to obtain more information on the 
corporation in its state of incorporation.   
The sanctions for failure to qualify differ.  In general, even 
though contracts are valid, the corporation cannot maintain an 
action in state courts,103 and the state has the right to enjoin the 
corporation from doing business in the state and to impose pen-
alties.104  But the sanctions can be more drastic as well.  For 
  
 99. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105(a)(5)(A), 2111 (West 1990 & Supp. 
2002); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 376(b) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP . LAW § 
1304(a)(6)–(7) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 100. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2111, 2203 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 382(a) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 307(a) (McKin-
ney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 101. See supra Part II.D. 
 102. A defendant foreign corporation that has transacted business in the 
forum state cannot escape service of process by either withdrawing from the 
state, CAL. CORP. CODE § 2112(a)(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002), DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 381 (2001), N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1310(a)(5) (McKinney’s 1986 
& Supp. 2002), or by having failed to qualify at all, see supra note 100. 
 103. At least until it has qualified and paid outstanding fines and taxes.  
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2203(c) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 383 (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1312(a) (McKinney’s 1986 & 
Supp. 2002). 
 104. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.02 (1999); CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 2203 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 378, 383–84 
(2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW  § 1312(a) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
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example, in Alabama, contracts concluded by non-qualified for-
eign corporations are unenforceable.105  Failure to qualify does 
not enable a corporation to escape service of process.106 
But qualification also has advantages for the foreign corpora-
tion.  In return, they receive not only the authorization to 
transact intrastate business, but also equal treatment in com-
parison to domestic corporations.107 
2. Applicability and Exceptions 
The applicability of qualification statutes is determined by 
the question of whether the foreign corporation “does business” 
in the forum state.  “Doing business” seems to be a very broad 
term, yet in this context it requires more than it does for the 
purpose of establishing jurisdiction.108 
The first test is whether the corporation does intrastate as 
opposed to interstate business.  California limits the application 
of its statute by explicitly forbidding foreign corporations from 
doing “intrastate business” without having qualified first.109  
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the statutes 
  
 105. ALA. CODE § 10-2B-15.02 (1994). 
 106. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 382(a) (2001).  See also supra note 
100. 
 107. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1306 (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002) 
(granting foreign corporations the powers accorded to them by their state of 
incorporation, but no greater powers than domestic corporations).  See supra 
note 78 and infra Part IV.A.3. 
 108. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); DEL 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 373(b), 382(b) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(c) 
(McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002).  For a detailed analysis of the “doing busi-
ness” criterion, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAWS  § 8.01 
[D] (Aspen Law & Business 2002 & Supp. 2001–2002).  See also W.J. Dunn, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Doing Business Within State by a Foreign 
Magazine, Newspaper, or Other Publishing Corporation, for Purposes other 
than Taxation, 38 A.L.R.2d 747 (1954); E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Leasing of 
Real Estate by Foreign Corporation, as Lessor or Lessee, as Doing Business 
within State within Statutes Prescribing Conditions of Right to do Business, 
59 A.L.R.2d 1131 (1958); R.F. Cox, Annotation, Holding Directors’, Officers’, 
Stockholders’, or Sales Meetings or Conventions in a State by Foreign Corpora-
tion as Doing Business or Otherwise Subjecting it to Service of Process and 
Suit, 84 A.L.R.2d 412 (1962); Annotation, Construction Work by Foreign Cor-
poration as Doing Business for the Purposes of Statute Requiring Foreign Cor-
poration to Qualify as Condition of Access to Local Courts, 90 A.L.R.3d 937 
(1979). 
 109. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
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of New York and Delaware do the same.  They forbid foreign 
corporations from doing business “in this state,”110 and Dela-
ware111 and California112 make an express exception if the cor-
poration’s business operations in the state “are wholly inter-
state in character.”  The constitutional underpinnings of the 
interstate/intrastate distinction will be discussed in the next 
section.113 
Even if it can be established that the business activities con-
ducted within the host state are intrastate in character and suf-
ficient to allow the exercise of jurisdiction, it does not follow 
that they necessarily constitute “doing business” for purposes of 
the qualification statutes.  The state statutes expressly exclude 
certain activities from the determination process such as main-
taining or defending an action,114 activities concerning internal 
affairs (e.g., holding directors’ or shareholders’ meetings),115 
maintaining bank accounts,116 and certain activities related to 
  
 110. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.02(a) (1999); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§§ 371(b), 373(a)(4) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(a) (McKinney’s 1986 
& Supp. 2002). 
 111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 373(a)(4) (2001).  The wording of this provision 
indicates that §§ 373(a)(1)–(3) are subcategories of the “wholly interstate in 
character” test.  These subcategories seem to be derived from case law.  See 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Wallace Constr. 
Co. v. Industrial Boiler Co., 470 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Ala. 1985); Detsch & Co. v. 
Calbar, Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 626, 633 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).  The same is 
true for the exemption of insurance companies (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
373(a)(5) (2001)) since the U.S. Supreme Court has held the sale of insurance 
is commerce of interstate nature.  See United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944); Legion Ins. Co. v. Garner Ins. Agency, 
991 F.Supp. 1326, 1330 (M.D. Ala. 1997).  The loaning of money is also not an 
interstate transaction since money is not a commodity of bargain, Contel 
Credit Corp. v. Tiger, Inc., 520 N.E.2d 1385, 1386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).  This 
is consistent with the denial of banking powers to foreign corporations.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 379 (2001). 
 112. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002) (“other than inter-
state or foreign commerce . . .”). 
 113. See infra Part IV .A.3. 
 114. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(b)(1) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 115. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. BUS . CORP. 
LAW § 1301(b)(2) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 116. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. BUS . CORP. 
LAW § 1301(b)(3) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
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the corporation’s securities.117  California law further provides 
that effecting sales through independent contractors,118 solicit-
ing and procuring orders that require acceptance outside the 
state,119 pledging real or personal property as security,120 iso-
lated transactions, and intrastate activities carried out by a 
subsidiary121 do not constitute intrastate business.122 
3. Constitutionality of Qualification Statutes 
Qualification statutes are generally held to be constitutional.  
This dates back to the notion articulated in Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle123 and Paul v. Virginia124 that, although corporations may 
very well have legal personality, they are nevertheless not citi-
zens of the United States for purposes of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.125  As creations of only the chartering state, 
they have no legal existence outside their state of incorporation 
and are recognized only through comity.126  Thus, if other states 
are therefore free to exclude them completely from entering 
their territory, they are also free to admit them under condi-
tions.127 
  
 117. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. BUS . CORP. 
LAW § 1301(b)(4) (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 118. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(5) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
 119. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(6) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
 120. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(7) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).  See also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 373 (a)(6)–(7) (2001). 
 121. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
 122. CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c)(8) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).  For additional 
exceptions for foreign lending institutions see CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(d) (West 
1990 & Supp. 2002). 
 123. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839). 
 124. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177–78 (1868). 
 125. “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several states.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 126. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 589. 
 127. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 652 (1895); Horn Silver Mining Co. 
v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 314 (1892); In re Trust Estate of Willard Sauls-
bury, Deceased, 233 A.2d 739, 744 (Del. Ch. 1967); German-American Coffee 
Co. v. Diehl, 109 N.E. 875, 877 (N.Y. 1915); Great N. Ry. Co. v. State (two 
cases), 267 P. 506, 509–10 (Wash. 1928).  This includes posing the condition to 
reincorporate locally.  Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 
282 U.S. 440, 444 (1931); Beveridge, supra note 18, at 702.  See also Bungert, 
supra note 38, at 606–609.  This argument is not available in the EC.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 332 & 351. 
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Qualification statutes are also held to be constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause.128  The only relevant question in this 
context seems to be whether the foreign corporation is actually 
involved in intrastate commerce.129  If that is the case, the 
qualification statutes can constitutionally be applied, if not, 
(i.e., if the foreign corporation is engaged solely in interstate 
business), the application is in violation of the Commerce 
Clause.130  This distinction is reflected by state statutes that 
expressly exempt foreign corporations engaged in interstate 
commerce,131 thus avoiding unconstitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause. 
Yet, the new balancing test in Commerce Clause cases, as 
stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.132 — according to which a 
statute will be upheld if it “regulates evenhandedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental . . . unless the burden . . . on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits” — casts doubt on the continuous validity of this seem-
ingly all or nothing approach.  It seems that even if the foreign 
corporation does intrastate business, a state qualification stat-
ute could be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.  
In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down an Ohio statute that tolled a stat-
ute of limitations defense, amongst others, for unqualified for-
  
 128. “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Bendix Auto-
lite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 899 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); Sternberg v. 
O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1114 (Del. 1988).  See also Bungert, supra note 38, at 
609–611.  See generally Horowitz, supra note 14. 
 129. This seems to be the relevant question in almost every case.  See, e.g., 
Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 22–24 (1974); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961); Union Brokerage Co., 322 U.S. at 
202; Wallace Constr. Co. v. Industrial Boiler Co., 470 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Ala. 
1985); cases cited infra note 130. 
 130. Allenberg Cotton Co., 419 U.S. at 32; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 
(1891); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 291 (1921); 
Eli Lilly, 366 U.S. at 279; Great N. Ry. Co., 267 P. at 509; Int’l Textbook Co. v. 
Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 111–12 (1910); Vest v. Night Commander Lighting Co., 139 
So. 295 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931).  But see Allenberg Cotton Co., 419 U.S. at 37 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 131. See supra Part IV.A.2. and note 111. 
 132. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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eign corporations.133  The court held that state interests “legiti-
mate for equal protection or due process purposes may be insuf-
ficient to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny” and considered 
the burden imposed on interstate commerce to be unjustified by 
Ohio interests.134 This has led the Delaware Supreme Court, in 
Sternberg v. O’Neil, to declare that “it is clear that any statute 
which causes a foreign corporation to register and thereby con-
sent to the general jurisdiction of a state, or in the absence of 
that registration and consent, to be subjected to regulations 
that are inconsistent with those for domestic corporations, is a 
burden that violates the federal commerce clause.”135  This un-
derstanding of Bendix would, however, render all qualification 
statutes unconstitutional, and the Delaware Supreme Court 
continued to distinguish Bendix on the grounds that the Dela-
ware qualification statute, as opposed to the Ohio tolling stat-
ute, was not “coercive” and therefore valid.136 Yet, the essential 
difference between the cases cannot be the question of “coercive 
penalties” since the burden on interstate commerce is to be 
measured by the costs of compliance with the statutes, not by 
the sanctions for non-compliance.137  Bendix can be explained as 
a case not involving qualification, but rather a question of sub-
stantive law that openly discriminated against all foreign cor-
porations, even where the discrimination served no purpose, 
since these companies were already subject to Ohio jurisdiction 
and could be reached.138  Thus Bendix does not overrule all pre-
  
 133. 486 U.S. 888. 
 134. Id. at 894. 
 135. Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Del. 1988). 
 136. Id. at 1114. Especially since the Delaware statute (like other state 
statutes, see, for example, supra note 103) applies only until the foreign cor-
poration has qualified, thus allowing it to correct its mistake and gain access 
to the state courts. 
 137. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 42 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (interpreting the Court’s decisions in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-
Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 282–283 (1961); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 444 (1931)). This is especially im-
portant for states that impose harsher sanctions for failure to qualify than 
denial of access to state courts (e.g., Alabama). 
 138. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 
898 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, for the purpose of the statute it would 
be sufficient to require that foreign corporations subject themselves to the 
specific jurisdiction of Ohio, yet the statute goes beyond that and forces them 
to consent to general jurisdiction. See also the opinion by Chief Justice 
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vious cases that have recognized the states’ right to demand 
qualification. 
In sum, a state may require a foreign corporation to qualify 
when it engages in intrastate commerce.139  If the foreign corpo-
ration is engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce, 
the state may require qualification, but impose sanctions only 
with respect to the intrastate aspect of the business.140  How-
ever, the most difficult question remains to be solved.  When is 
a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce and when 
in intrastate commerce? 
The courts repeat that this question must be determined on 
the individual facts of each case.141  But there are some guide-
lines.  First, the mere fact that a foreign corporation acts in an-
other state does not make that transaction “interstate.”142  Sec-
ond, the state statutes have tried to reproduce the case law; in 
particular, Delaware’s exceptions to the requirement of qualifi-
cation are mainly based on the interstate/intrastate distinction 
as drawn by the courts.143  Third, as a general rule all transac-
tions that involve the shipment of goods over state borders, plus 
the transactions incidental and essential thereto, are in inter-
state commerce.144  Fourth, a foreign corporation’s business is 
  
Rehnquist in this case (at 899), dissenting on the ground that the contract was 
in fact an intrastate contract and that Ohio in that case would have been enti-
tled to apply its tolling statute. 
 139. Eli Lilly, 366 U.S. at 279; Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 
202, 210 (1944). 
 140. Eli Lilly, 366 U.S. at 282–283; Furst & Thomas v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 
493, 498 (1931); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 203 (1914); Union 
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, supra note 128, at 211.  Cf. Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. 
at 899 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 141. Contel Credit Corp. v. Tiger, Inc., 520 N.E.2d 1385, 1386 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1987); Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Blalock, 525 So.2d 1366, 1370 (Ala. 
1988); Stewart Machine and Engineering Co. v. Checkers Drive In Restau-
rants of North America, Inc., 575 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Ala. 1991); Puffer Mfg. Co. 
v. Kelly, 73 So. 403 (Ala. 1916); Wallace Constr. Co. v. Industrial Boiler Co., 
470 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Ala. 1985). 
 142. But compare the solution in the European Community, infra Part VI.B.  
See also notes 127, 331, 332 and 351. 
 143. See supra Part IV.A.2. and notes 111 and 131. 
 144. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 30 (1974).  See Wallace 
Constr. Co., 470 So.2d at 1153–1154; Contel Credit Corp., 520 N.E.2d at 1386; 
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290 (1921); York Mfg. 
Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21 (1918) (distinguishing Gen. Ry. Signal & Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 246 U.S. 500 (1918)). 
File: Kersting Base  Macro F2.doc Created on: 10/30/2002 7:42 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:25 PM 
2002] CORPORATE CHOICE OF LAW 25 
intrastate when it has entered the state through its agents and 
carries on a substantial part of its usual business in the state.145  
Thus, if the above-mentioned requirements are met, qualifica-
tion statutes are constitutional.146 
B. Outreach Statutes 
Outreach statutes are the legislative pendants to the “un-
usual circumstances” exception to the internal affairs rule.  
They apply the substantive law of the forum state to foreign 
corporations if certain conditions are met.147 
1. Content 
The New York outreach statute subjects foreign corporations 
to provisions of substantive New York law regarding the right 
to inspect the record of shareholders,148 the filing of a record of 
voting trusts,149 the liability of directors and officers,150 the li-
  
 145. Contel Credit Corp., 520 N.E.2d at 1386; Georgia Lumber & Veneer 
Corp. v. Solem Machine Co., 150 F. Supp. 126, 131 (Ga. Dist. Ct. 1957); Legion 
Ins. Co. v. Garner Ins. Agency, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (M.D. Ala. 1997); 
Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 75 S.E.2d 556, 558 (Ga. 1953). 
 146. For questions of constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause, 
see Bungert, supra note 38, at 627–629, 662–663. On constitutionality with 
respect to foreign corporation law, see generally William Laurens Walker, 
Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 47 N.C. L. REV. 733 (1969); 
John J. Stenger & William B. Gwyn, Foreign Corporations in North Carolina: 
The “Doing Business” Standards of Qualification, Taxation, and Jurisdiction, 
16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 711, 715–20 (1980). 
 147. For these conditions, see infra Part IV.B.2. 
 148. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1315 (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002).  The 
statute was held to be constitutional in Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 53 
(2d Cir. 1991).  See also Potraker, supra note 47, at 881–85. 
 149. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1316 (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
 150. Id. § 1317. 
Liabilities of directors and officers of foreign corporations.  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the directors and of-
ficers of a foreign corporation doing business in this state are subject, 
to the same extent as directors and officers of a domestic corporation, 
to the provisions of:  
(1) Section 719 (Liability of directors in certain cases) except 
subparagraph (a)(3) thereof, and  
(2) Section 720 (Action against directors and officers for miscon-
duct.) 
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ability of a foreign corporation for failure to disclose required 
information,151 etc.152  
  
(b) Any liability imposed by paragraph (a) may be enforced in, and 
such relief granted by, the courts in this state, in the same manner as 
in the case of a domestic corporation. 
Id. 
 151. Id. § 1318.  
Liability of foreign corporations for failure to disclose re-
quired information 
(a) A foreign corporation doing business in this state shall, in the 
same manner as a domestic corporation, disclose to its shareholders 
of record who are residents of this state the information required un-
der paragraph (c) of section 510 (Dividends or other distributions in 
cash or property), paragraphs (f) and (g) of section 511 (Share distri-
butions and changes), paragraph (d) of section 515 (Reacquired 
shares), paragraph (c) of section 516 (Reduction of stated capital in 
certain cases), and shall be liable as provided in section 520 (Liability 
for failure to disclose required information) for failure to comply in 
good faith with these requirements. 
Id. 
 152. Id. § 1319.  
Applicability of other provisions 
(a) [T]he following provisions, to the extent provided therein, shall 
apply to a foreign corporation doing business in this state, its direc-
tors, officers and shareholders:  
(1) Section 623 (Procedure to enforce shareholder's right to re-
ceive payment for shares).  
(2) Section 626 (Shareholders’ derivative action brought in the 
right of the corporation to procure a judgment  in its favor).  
(3) Section 627 (Security for expenses in shareholders’ derivative 
action brought in the right of the corporation to procure a judg-
ment in its favor).  
(4) Sections 721 (Exclusivity of statutory provisions for indemni-
fication of directors and officers) through 727 (Insurance for in-
demnification of directors and officers), inclusive.  
(5) Section 808 (Reorganization under act of congress).  
(6) Section 907 (Merger or consolidation of domestic and foreign 
corporations).  
Id.  For earlier developments in New York law and constitutional implications 
see Donald L. Block Baraf, The Foreign Corporation — A Problem in Choice of 
Law Doctrine, 33 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (1967). 
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California has the broadest outreach statute, which subjects 
foreign corporations to a multitude of provisions of its substan-
tive law.  Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code pro-
vides:153 
(a) A foreign corporation (. . . including a foreign parent corpo-
ration even though it does not itself transact intrastate busi-
ness) is subject to the requirements of subdivision (b) com-
mencing on the date specified in subdivision (d) and continu-
ing until the date specified in subdivision (e) if: 154 
. . . . 
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), the following chap-
ters and sections of this division shall apply to a foreign corpo-
ration as defined in subdivision (a) (to the exclusion of the law 
of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated): 
 . . . . 
Section 301 (annual election of directors); 
Section 303 (removal of directors without cause); 
Section 304 (removal of directors by court pr oceedings); 
Section 305, subdivision (c) (filling of director vacancies 
where less than a majority in office elected by sharehold-
ers); 
Section 309 (directors’ standard of care); 
Section 316 (. . . liability of directors for unlawful distribu-
tions); 
Section 317 (indemnification of directors, officers, and oth-
ers); 
Sections 500 to 505, inclusive (limitations on corporate dis-
tributions in cash or property); 
Section 506 (liability of shareholder who receives unlawful 
distribution); 
Section 600, subdivisions (b) and (c) (requirement for an-
nual shareholders’ meeting and remedy if same not timely 
held); 
  
 153. For a comparison of California and Delaware law with respect to CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 2115, see Halloran & Hammer, supra note 43, at 1295–1324; 
Newman, supra note 62, at 132. 
 154. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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Section  708, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) (shareholder's 
right to cumulate votes at any election of directors); 
Section 710 (supermajority vote requirement); 
Section 1001, subdivision (d) (limitations on sale of assets); 
Section 1101 (. . . limitations on mergers); 
Chapter 12 (. . . reorganizations); 
Chapter 13 (. . . dissenters’ rights); 
Sections 1500 and 1501 (records and reports); 
Section 1508 (action by Attorney General); 
Chapter 16 (. . . rights of inspection). 
 . . . . 
(f) Any foreign corporation that is subject to the requirements 
of subdivision (b) shall advise any shareholder of record, any 
officer, director, employee, or other agent . . . and any creditor 
of the corporation in writing, within 30 days of receipt of writ-
ten request for that information, whether or not it is subject to 
subdivision (b) at the time the request is received. . . . 
New York and California are not the only states that subject 
foreign corporations under certain conditions to provisions of 
their own law.  Other states have or had similar statutes.155  
  
 155. See Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., 844 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) 
(parties chose Missouri law on issuance of stock applied to Delaware corpora-
tion); Joncas v. Krueger, 213 N.W.2d. 1 (Wis. 1974) (Wisconsin: shareholders 
of domestic and foreign corporations liable for wages); Toklan Royalty Corpo-
ration v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d 571, 573 (Okla. 1943) (Oklahoma: forum law on 
inspection of books and records applied to Delaware corporation).  See also  
Thomas v. Mathiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914) (California: unlimited liability of 
shareholders applied to New York shareholder of Arizona corporation); Pinney 
v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901) (unlimited liability of shareholders applied to 
California shareholder of Colorado corporation); Armstrong v. Dyer, 198 N.E. 
551 (N.Y. 1935) (law making shareholders liable for wages does not apply to 
foreign corporations); Provident Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes, 159 P. 155 (Cal. 
1916) (shareholder liability); German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 109 N.E. 
875, 877 (N.Y. 1915) (New York: liability of directors of foreign corporations 
for unlawful distributions); Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (4th 
App. Dist. 1983) (California: forum law on inspection of corporate records ap-
plied over Delaware law). 
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2. Applicability and Exceptions 
These outreach statutes do not apply under all circumstances.  
First, they are limited to specific issues of substantive law and 
do not substitute the foreign law completely for the forum law.  
Second, they do not apply to all foreign corporations, but only to 
such foreign corporations that have substantial contacts with 
the forum state.  Third, certain corporations are generally ex-
empted from their application. 
The California statute tries to assure that it only applies to 
corporations that do not have any (more) significant contacts 
with other states.  Section 2115(a)(1) of the California Corpo-
rate Code provides: 
(1) the average of the property factor, the payroll factor, and 
the sales factor . . . with respect to it is more than 50 percent 
during its latest full income year and  
(2) more than one-half of its outstanding voting securities are 
held of record by persons having addresses in this state ap-
pearing on the books of the corporation on the record date for 
the latest meeting of shareholders held during its latest full 
income year or, if no meeting was held during that year, on 
the last day of the latest full income year. . . .156 
Thus, even if other states were to adopt the same rule, corpo-
rations would not be subjected to inconsistent regulations be-
cause only one state at a time could have the necessary contacts 
with the foreign corporation.  However, different methods of 
calculation might still lead to a situation where the laws of two 
states apply.  That risk is reduced to some extent by incorporat-
ing the calculation method into the outreach statute,157 but, 
since reference is made to external (tax) laws, it is not com-
pletely e liminated.  Yet, that is not the point.  It is unrealistic to 
believe that other states would actually adopt the exact same 
rule.  The whole idea of hypothetically asking what would hap-
pen if other states were to adopt the exact same rule,158 can only 
be explained as a test to determine whether the state made 
enough of an effort to avoid inconsistencies.  This will reduce 
  
 156. CAL. CORP. CODE  § 2115(a)(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).  See also Hal-
loran & Hammer, supra note 43, at 1284–88. 
 157. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b)(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
 158. This test was used in Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 
Cal. Rptr. 852, 860 (1st App. Div. 1982). 
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inconsistencies to a great extent as a practical matter, but will 
not exclude their theoretical possibility.159  
The California outreach statute further provides a time frame 
stating when the substantive law provisions begin to apply once 
the necessary contacts are established and when they cease to 
apply after the company no longer fulfills the criteria.160  For-
eign corporations listed on a national securities exchange are 
generally exempted.161  
New York law takes a similar approach and (partially) ex-
empts foreign corporations from the application of its outreach 
provisions if the corporation is listed on a national security ex-
change or if less than one half of the corporation’s taxable in-
come is allocable to New York.162 
  
 159. Id.  Cf.  infra text accompanying note 177. 
 160. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(d), (e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
[(d)] For purposes of subdivision (a), the requirements of subdivision 
(b) shall become applicable to a foreign corporation only upon the first 
day of the first income year of the corporation (i) commencing on or 
after the 135th day of the income year immediately following the lat-
est income year with respect to which the tests referred to in subdivi-
sion (a) have been met or (ii) commencing on or after the entry of a fi-
nal order by a court of competent jurisdiction declaring that those 
tests have been met.  
[(e)] For purposes of subdivision (a), the requirements of subdivision 
(b) shall cease to be applicable to a foreign corporation (i) at the end 
of the first income year of the corporation immediately following the 
latest income year with respect to which at least one of the tests re-
ferred to in subdivision (a) is not met or (ii) at the end of the income 
year of the corporation during which a final order has been entered 
by a court of competent jurisdiction declaring that one of those tests 
is not met, provided that a contrary order has not been entered before 
the end of the income year. 
Id. 
 161. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
(c) This section does not apply to any corporation (1) with outstanding 
securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American 
Stock Exchange, or (2) with outstanding securities designated as 
qualified for trading on the Nasdaq National Market (or any succes-
sor thereto) of the Nasdaq Stock Market operated by the Nasdaq 
Stock Market Inc., or (3) if all of its voting shares (other than direc-
tors' qualifying shares) are owned directly or indirectly by a corpora-
tion or corporations not subject to this section. 
Id. 
 162. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKinney’s 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
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3. Constitutionality 
Outreach statutes are held to be constitutional — no court 
seems to have questioned the concept of outreach statutes per 
se and the individual statutes have generally been upheld 
against constitutional challenges.163 The positive justification 
again is that outreach statutes can be imposed on the corpora-
tion as a condition of doing business in the host state.164 
  
Exemption from certain provisions. 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a foreign 
corporation doing business in this state which is authorized under 
this article, its directors, officers and shareholders, shall be exempt 
from the provisions of paragraph (e) of section 1316 (Voting trust re-
cords), subparagraph (a)(1) of section 1317 (Liabilities of directors 
and officers of foreign corporations), section 1318 (liability of foreign 
corporations for failure to disclose required information) and sub-
paragraph (a)(4) of section 1319 (Applicability of other provisions) if 
when such provision would otherwise apply: 
(1) Shares of such corporation were listed on a national securities 
exchange, or 
(2) Less than one-half of the total of its business income for the 
preceding three fiscal years, or such portion thereof as the for-
eign corporation was in existence, was allocable to this state for 
franchise tax purposes under the tax law. 
Id. 
 163. See Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1991); Beveridge, supra  
note 18, at 703–15 (discussing the constitutional issues). But see the Arden-
Mayfair, Inc. conflict where apparently in 1978 a California court filed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law holding the California outreach statute to 
be unconstitutional. However, the case was settled in 1979, and in 1982 the 
California statute was explicitly upheld by the California Court of Appeal in 
Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1st App. Div. 
1982); Beveridge, supra note 18, at 706 n.63. 
 164. See supra IV.A.3.; Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901); Joncas v. 
Krueger, 213 N.W.2d. 1, 4 (Wis. 1974) (shareholder liability); German-
American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 109 N.E. 875, 877 (N.Y. 1915) (directors’ liabil-
ity); State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Corp. Co. of Del., 2 N.W.2d 372, 386 
(Iowa 1942) (issuance of stock against par value only).  See also Kozyris, supra 
note 31, at 42 (discussing the distinction between the “organic powers” of a 
corporation that are determined by the lex incorporationis and the exercise of 
such powers, which depends on the law of the forum). 
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a. Full Faith and Credit Clause 
This constitutional provision requires that “Full Faith and 
Credit . . . be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and 
Judicial Proceedings of every other state”165 and has been con-
strued to include state statutes.166 It could therefore be argued 
that the forum state has to apply the lex incorporationis by vir-
tue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  However, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not lead to the absurd result that 
each state has to apply the laws of other states and can never 
apply its own law.167  The full faith and credit requirement does 
not prevent a host state from applying its own law if it has a 
“significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creat-
ing state interests, such that the choice of its law is neither ar-
bitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”168  Applying that test to the 
outreach statutes of New York and California, it becomes evi-
dent that both statutes pass this test: they apply only if the host 
state has very substantial contacts with the foreign corporation 
— specifically, if the host state has more contacts than any 
other state — and they are both designed to prevent circumven-
tion of the host state’s public policy.169 
  
 165. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 166. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 
532, 546 (1935); Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 856. 
 167. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547 (weighing the states’ interests 
against each other); Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 856. 
 168. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–3 (1981); Wilson v. Lou-
isiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal.Rptr. 852, 857 (1st App. Div. 1982); 
State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Corp. Co. of Delaware, 2 N.W.2d 372, 395 
(Iowa 1942). See also McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d. 206, 218 (Del. 1987). 
See Kozyris, supra note 31, at 31; J. Thomas Oldham, Regulating the Regula-
tors: Limitations Upon a State’s Ability to Regulate Corporations with Multi-
State Contacts, 57 DENVER L.J. 345, 360 (1980). 
 169. See Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 858 (distinguishing Broderick v. Rosner, 
294 U.S. 629 (1935)).  See also Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922, 
925 (4th App. Dist. 1983) (dictum, since court held that inspection of books 
was not an internal affair); Getridge v. State Capital Co., 18 P.2d 375 (Cal. 
1933).  See also Thome v. Macken, 136 P.2d 116, 117–18 (Cal Ct. App. 1943) 
(quoting 5 Ruling Case Law 911 § 5) (application of foreign law against public 
policy of forum); Douglas E. Noll, California’s New General Corporation Law: 
Quasi-Foreign Corporations, 7 PAC. L.J. 673, 697–98 (1976); Oldham, supra 
note 43, at 114–121. 
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b. Commerce Clause 
Regarding outreach statutes, the Commerce Clause170 plays a 
less significant role than with respect to qualification statutes.  
Whereas qualification requirements directly affect the corpora-
tion’s business by determining whether the foreign corporation 
is entitled to do business in the forum state at all, outreach 
statutes only affect the internal affairs of the corporation and 
not its relation to third parties; outreach statutes merely force 
foreign corporations to play by the same rules as domestic cor-
porations and do not have any specific commerce aspects.  Ef-
fects on commerce, let alone interstate commerce, if any, will 
only be intermediate and incidental.171  
Yet, the California outreach statute was thought to be in vio-
lation of the Commerce Clause because of uncertainty as to its 
applicability.  Scholars criticized that it was not always clear to 
the corporation when the statute applied, and pointed to prob-
lems associated with the treatment of nominee shareholders 
and the fluctuation in business experienced by new corporations 
in particular.172  
Still, some of these problems have been dealt with by the 
California legislature, and the California Court of Appeals in 
Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc. rejected the conten-
tion that the California outreach statute, which provided for 
cumulative voting, was unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause.173  It held first that, since cumulative voting applied to 
both domestic and foreign companies, the statute did not place 
a distinctive burden on out-of-state interests and regulated 
  
 170. But see Kozyris, supra note 31, at 33–46; Stephen R. Ginger, Regula-
tion of Quasi-Foreign Corporations in California: Reflections on Section 2115 
after Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 14 SW. U. L. REV. 665, 671–
76 (1984). 
 171. See Valtz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 925. 
 172. Ginger, supra note 170, at 677; Mark E. Kruse, California’s Statutory 
Attempt to Regulate Foreign Corporations: Will It Survive The Commerce 
Clause?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943, 956–61 (1979); Oldham, supra note 168, at 
369–370, 379.  The statute was considered to be constitutional by Noll, supra 
note 169, at 696. 
 173. Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 862 (1st 
App. Div. 1982). See the description by Kozyris, supra note 31, at 58–60. It 
should be noted, however, that the case was moot and limited to the cumula-
tive voting provision.  See Ginger, supra note 170, at 667. 
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“even-handedly” in the sense of the Pike test. 174  The court then 
rejected the contention that the statute affected interstate 
commerce by creating an incentive to remain below the applica-
bility threshold because that effect was neither intended by the 
legislature nor proven to actually exist.175 Finally, the court 
dealt with the U.S. Supreme Court’s requirement that corpora-
tions should not be subjected to conflicting demands176 by em-
phasizing that there was no actual conflict in this case and that 
the potential for conflict was very small since a corporation can 
do a majority of its business only in one state at a time.177 More-
over, the outreach statutes with their “majority of business in 
the host state” requirement can be construed as describing the 
“rarest situations” in which the Commerce Clause does not ob-
ject to foreign corporations being subjected to conflicting de-
mands.178 
c. Contracts Clause 
Courts have not held outreach statutes to be in violation of 
the Contracts Clause either.  The Contracts Clause provides 
that states shall make no law impairing the obligations of con-
tracts179 and defendants have tried to argue that outreach stat-
utes, especially the old California rule of unlimited shareholder 
liability, interfered with their corporation contract.  Yet, while 
the courts seemed to accept this argument in principle, it never 
carried the day, because it was always held that either the 
shareholder had contracted with a view to the law of the host 
state180 or that the state had authorized the company to bind it 
  
 174. See cases cited supra note 132. 
 175. Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860.  See also Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 188 
Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (4th App. Dist. 1983). 
 176. Supra Part II.B. 
 177. Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860. See supra text accompanying notes 158 
& 159. 
 178. This presupposes that “rarest situation” does not mean that the situa-
tion hardly ever occurs, but that it is an unusual situation (see the language 
of RESTATEMENT § 302) not envisaged by the general corporation law, which 
expects that a foreign corporation’s “most significant relationship” point to 
another state, i.e., its state of incorporation.  See supra text accompanying 
note 41. 
 179. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 180. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 234 (1914); Pinney v. Nelson, 
183 U.S. 144, 147 (1901). 
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in any given state by conferring power on it to transact busi-
ness181 or that the corporation was formed after the enactment 
of the law.182 The modern test seems to be to determine whether 
there was a substantial impairment and whether such substan-
tial impairment could be justified given the nature and the pur-
pose of the state law.183 
Therefore, outreach statutes could be unconstitutional under 
the Contracts Clause if they substantially impair contractual 
obligations without sufficient justification.  However, California 
law imposing cumulative voting on a foreign corporation was 
held to be only a minimal alteration.184 
d. Due Process Clause 
Outreach statutes do not deprive the foreign corporation of 
due process of law.185 For a state to be able to apply its local law 
over foreign law, it is sufficient that its contacts with the dis-
pute are not too slight and too casual to make the application of 
local law consistent with due process.186 This resembles the 
“minimum contacts test” used to establish whether a state can 
exercise jurisdiction.187 The outreach statutes of California and 
New York, which apply only to companies that do a majority of 
their business in these states, undoubtedly pass the due process 
threshold of minimum contacts.188 
  
 181. Provident Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes, 159 P. 155, 157 (Cal. 1916). 
 182. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70 (1954); 
Pinney, 232 U.S. at 147. 
 183. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 
400, 411–17 (1983); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
244–45 (1978); Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 
862 (1st App. Div. 1982). 
 184. Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
 185. “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 186. Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 861–862; Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 922, 926 (4th App. Dist. 1983); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 
179, 181–82 (1964); Watson, 348 U.S. at 71–73.  See Oldham, supra note 43, at 
111–113; Oldham, supra note 168, at 354–56. 
 187. See supra Part II.D.  See Kozyris, supra note 31, at 31–32. 
 188. Noll, supra note 169, at 696–97. For questions concerning a retrospec-
tive law applying to vested rights, see Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 861, in which 
the court points out that the defendant has to overcome a presumption of con-
stitutionality by showing arbitrariness or irrationality. See also State ex rel. 
Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Corp. Co. of Del., 2 N.W.2d 372, 395 (Iowa 1942). 
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e. Equal Protection Clause 
Foreign corporations cannot rely on the Equal Protection 
Clause189 to escape application of outreach statutes.  Unlike 
qualification statutes, which exclude foreign corporations alto-
gether or treat them differently by applying sanctions, outreach 
statutes are designed to provide equal treatment with domestic 
corporations.  Therefore, there is no different treatment under 
this aspect and the Equal Protection Clause is not violated.190  
Neither can the foreign corporation argue that it is denied equal 
protection with respect to other foreign corporations listed on a 
national securities exchange, which are exempt from the out-
reach statute, because the exemption is based on the rational 
basis that the regulations of such an exchange provide an ade-
quate substitute.191 
V. COMPARISON TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A. Applicable Law 
In Europe, like in the U.S., there is no “federal” or European 
law on conflict of corporate laws and the EC Member States 
have traditionally applied their own conflict rules.192  The issue 
of how to treat foreign corporations is not seen primarily as an 
issue of the application of the “internal affairs rule.”  There 
seems to be agreement that a foreign corporation’s internal af-
fairs should be treated according to the laws of its home juris-
diction.193  The crucial question is, rather, where to find the 
home jurisdiction, in other words, how to determine the corpo-
ration’s “nationality.”  Whereas there seems to be a consensus 
in the U.S. to equate a company’s home jurisdiction with its 
  
 189. “[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 190. Watson, 348 U.S. at 70; Valtz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 926; State ex rel. 
Weede, 2 N.W.2d at 395.  See also Noll, supra note 169, at 698; Bungert, supra 
note 38, at 666–667. 
 191. Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 862–
863 (1st App. Div. 1982). 
 192. For further detail, see DANIEL ZIMMER, INTERNATIONALES 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (1996). 
 193. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht, in J. VON 
STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN Rn. 17 (1998). 
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place of incorporation,194 this is different in Europe.  As briefly 
mentioned above, there are two principal competing theories.195 
The “place of incorporation theory” determines a corporation’s 
nationality by its place of incorporation, i.e., the place where it 
is registered as a corporate entity.196 A corporation incorporated 
in the United Kingdom is therefore a British corporation.  The 
“real seat theory,” however, relies on the corporation’s seat of 
administration,197 which is defined as the place where the basic 
decisions of the board are effectively transformed into daily 
managerial and administrative decisions.198 Therefore, if a cor-
poration incorporated in the United Kingdom is managed from 
Germany,199 Germany would regard it as a German corpora-
tion200 — with devastating effects.  Until recently, the German 
Supreme Court for Civil Law argued as follows: since this Ger-
man corporation is not incorporated and not registered in Ger-
  
 194. See Blackburn, supra note 38, at 54–55. 
 195. For a brief overview, see Blackburn, supra note 38, at 85–88; Jan 
Wouters, Private International Law and Companies’ Freedom of Establish-
ment, 2 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 101, 103–10 (2001) 
[hereinafter E.B.O.R.]. 
 196. Peter Kindler, Internationales Handels– und Gesellschaftsrecht, in 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH Band II, Rn. 265–
68 (1999); Grossfeld, supra note 193, Rn. 20, 22. 
 197. Bundesgerichtshof, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivil-
sachen [BGHZ] 97, 269 (271); Kindler, supra note 196, Rn. 312–15; Grossfeld, 
supra note 193, Rn. 20, 26. 
 198. Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ 97, 269 (272); Grossfeld, supra note 193, Rn. 
228; Kindler, supra note 196, Rn. 316; Otto Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung der 
Überlagerungstherorie in einigen zentralen Einzelfragen, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
GÜNTHER BEITZKE 669, 683 (Otto Sandrock ed., 1979). There is also a pre-
sumption that a foreign corporation is managed from the place of its incorpo-
ration. See Oberlandesgericht München, DER BETRIEB  [DB] (1986), 1767 
(1768); Oberlandesgericht München, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
[NJW] 35 (1986), 2197 (2198); Kindler, supra note 196, Rn. 329. 
 199. See, e.g., Kammergericht, NJW 48 (1989), 3100 (3101); Oberlandes-
gericht Düsseldorf, NJW-Rechtsprechungs-Report Zivilrecht [NJW-RR] 18 
(1995), 1124 (1124); Oberlandesgericht München, NJW 35 (1986), 2197 (2198); 
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, NJW 35 (1986), 2199 (2199); Landgericht Mar-
burg, NJW-RR 4 (1993), 222 (223). 
 200. If a German court had to decide in matters of a corporation incorpo-
rated in Britain and managed from France, it would have to apply French law 
to that corporation.  Since France also follows the real seat theory, Grossfeld, 
supra note 193, Rn. 153, it would accept that referral so that French substan-
tive law would apply.  Id. Rn. 98, 105, 108.  For a comparison with the situa-
tion in the U.S., see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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many, it is non-existent, a nullity.  As such it does not have le-
gal personality and can neither own property, nor contract, nor 
sue.201  But such a foreign corporation can nevertheless be sued.  
Moreover, its members and everybody acting on its behalf will 
be held liable for its debts.202  The court has now joined the ma-
jority opinion among legal scholars and treats a foreign corpora-
tion having its real seat in Germany as a German corporation.  
It is therefore no longer considered to be a nullity for failure to 
incorporate according to German law, but is treated as a gen-
eral, partnership-like, company.203  These partnership-like com-
panies204 have at least limited legal personality and can own 
property and both sue and be sued, yet the downside is that the 
legal principles governing these companies provide for unlim-
ited liability of the partners. 
B. Delaware in Europe: The “Centros Effect” 
Thus the “real seat theory,” which is followed in many Euro-
pean jurisdictions,205 serves as an efficient countermeasure 
against pseudo-foreign corporations.  However, is a corporation 
registered in Britain and having its real seat in Germany actu-
ally a pseudo-foreign corporation if it does all or most of its 
business in Britain?  What if the shareholders were dispersed 
over Europe?  American outreach statutes would not apply to 
  
 201. Oberlandesgericht München, NJW-RR (1995), 703 (704). 
 202. See Bundesgerichtshof, DER BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 2000, 1106; 
Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ 97, 269 (272); Oberlandesgericht Oldenburg, NJW 
221 (1990), 1422 (1423); Kammergericht, NJW 48 (1989), 3100 (3101); Ober-
landesgericht Hamburg, NJW 35 (1986), 2199 (2199); Landgericht Marburg, 
NJW-RR 4 (1993), 222 (223); Kindler, supra note 196, Rn. 344–46; Grossfeld, 
supra note 193, Rn. 427, 436, 440–44.  See also Albrecht Randelzhofer/Ulrich 
Forsthoff, Artikel 48, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, BAND I, Rn. 5–6 
(Eberhard Grabitz & Meinhard Hilf eds., 2001). 
 203. Bundesgerichtshof, BB 40 (2002), 2031 (2032); Horst Eidenmüller & 
Gebhard Rehm, Gesellschafts- und zivilrechtliche Folgeprobleme der 
Sitztheorie, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 
1 (1997), 89 (90–91); Randelzhofer/Forsthoff, supra note 202, Rn. 5–6; Karsten 
Schmidt, Sitzverlegungsrichtlinie, Freizügigkeit und Gesellschaftsrechtspraxis, 
ZGR 1–2 (1999), 20 (24–25). 
 204. These companies are the Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts, §§ 705–740 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (German Civil Code), or the Offene 
Handelsgesellschaft, §§ 105–160, HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] (German Com-
mercial Code). 
 205. Grossfeld, supra note 193, Rn. 153. 
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such a corporation.  But the “real seat theory” poses a more se-
rious question: Is it compatible with the freedom of establish-
ment as guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of the European 
Community Treaty (“EC Treaty”)? 
Although many commentators believe that the ECJ’s Centros 
decision has answered this question in the negative,206 substan-
tial doubts remain,207 and it is unlikely that the upcoming deci-
  
 206. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT UND VERFAHRENSRECHT [IPRAX] 5 (2000), 418 (421) 
(For commentary on this decision, see Markus Heidinger, Case Comment, 15 
J. OF INT ’L BANKING L. 2000, N-8; Ilan Rappaport, Freedom of Establishment 
— A New Perspective, J. BUS. L. 2000, 628, 631–33); Oberster Gerichtshof, 
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EUZW] 5 (2000), 156 (159); 
Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Centros-Urteil 
des EuGH, IPRAX 5 (1999), 323; Robert Freitag, Der Wettbewerb der 
Rechtsordnungen im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht, EUZW 1999, 267; 
Günther H. Roth, Gründungstheorie: Ist der Damm gebrochen?, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 21 (1999), 861; Otto Sandrock, Centros: Ein 
Etappensieg für die Überlagerungstheorie, BB 26 (1999), 1337 (1342); Daniel 
Zimmer, Mysterium “Centros,” ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT 
UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 164 (2000), 23 (33).  Cf. Gérard Jazottes et al., 
Droit européen des affaires, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET 
DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE  220 (2000); Michel Menjucq, Liberté d’établissement et 
fraude en droit communautaire, RECUEIL DALLOZ 1999, JURISPRUDENCE , 550. 
 207. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof, BB 22 (2000), 1106 (1107); Amtsgericht 
Heidelberg, EUZW 3 (2000), 414 (reference for preliminary ruling; ECJ re-
fused case on procedural grounds, ECJ, Case C–86/00, HSB-Wohnbau GmbH, 
Order of 10 July 2001, NJW 43 (2001), 3179); Oberlandesgericht 
Brandenburg, NJW-RR 1 (2001), 29 (30) (holding that the real seat theory was 
still applicable); Landgericht Salzburg (Austria), IPRAX 6 (2001), 341 (refer-
ence for preliminary ruling; ECJ refused case on procedural grounds, ECJ, 
Case C–447/00, Holto Ltd., Order of 22 January 2002); Peter Behrens, Reac-
tions of Member State Courts to the Centros Ruling by the ECJ, 2 E.B.O.R. 
159, 160 (2001) (German original published in IPRAX 5 (2000), 384); Ulrich 
Forsthoff, Niederlassungsrecht für Gesellschaften nach dem Centros-Urteil des 
EuGH, EUROPARECHT 2 (2000), 167 (170); Peter Kindler, 
Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften?, NJW 28 (1999), 
1993 (1996); Brigitta Lurger, “Centros Revisited”: Die österreichische 
Sitztheorie und die Niederlassungsfreiheit des EG-Vertrages, IPRAX 4 (2001), 
346 (350–52); Randelzhofer/Forsthoff, supra note 202, Rn. 73–74; Wulf-
Henning Roth, “Centros”: Viel Lärm um Nichts? , ZGR 2 (2000), 311 (330–37); 
Hans Jürgen Sonnenberger & Helge Großerichter, Konfliktlinien zwischen 
internationalem Gesellschaftsrecht und Niederlassungsfreiheit, RECHT DER 
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 10 (1999), 721 (722); Wouters, supra 
note 195, at 115–20; Helen Xanthaki, Centros: Is this really the End for the 
Theory of the Siege Reel, 22 COMPANY LAWYER 2, 7 (2001). 
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sion of the ECJ in Überseering will bring much clarification.  
The Court is likely to follow the suggestion by Advocate General 
Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer and limit its holding to the ques-
tion whether a corporation can be denied legal personality un-
der the real seat theory.208 Even a negative answer would not 
abolish the real seat theory because it would leave open the 
possibility of treating a corporation, which is managed at home 
and incorporated abroad, like a domestic partnership-like com-
pany.  Yet, it is clear that the times of drastic application of the 
real seat theory are over.  The ECJ will over time probably take 
a pragmatic approach and decide on a case-by-case basis to 
what extent the application of forum law is acceptable.   
Thus, whether the ECJ will require the application of the 
place of incorporation theory throughout Europe or proceed on a 
case-by-case basis, the trend certainly goes in the direction of 
greater flexibility for incorporators.  EC Member States will 
therefore be faced with the question of how to deal with corpo-
rations that evade mandatory rules of the forum law by simply 
incorporating abroad. 
Even if the EC Member States will then have to accept that 
more often than not foreign law prevails, it remains to be seen 
how vigorous and dramatic state competition will be under this 
“Centros Effect.”  Quite a few factors indicate that state compe-
tition will be less vigorous in Europe than in the U.S.209  First, 
  
According to the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, RIW 6 (2001), 463, and the  
Oberlandesgericht Hamm, RIW  6 (2001), 461, the Centros decision did not 
change the rule that a German corporation cannot transfer its seat (whether 
real or statutory) to another state, a corporate decision to that effect being 
treated as a decision to dissolve the corporation. See also Oberlandesgericht 
Frankfurt, RIW 10 (1999), 783 (place of incorporation theory applies where 
company has no actual real seat) (comment by Stefan Haack in RIW 1 (2000), 
57); Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, RIW 5 (2001), 373 (applying real seat 
theory in matter involving a corporation from Costa Rica); Landgericht 
München I, IPRAX 2 (2001), 137 (foreign companies to be recognized following 
Centros only where duly organized and existing under foreign law). 
 208. Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Case C–208/00, Überseering BV 
v. NCC Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (Dec. 4, 2001), 
Celex No. 600C0208. See also Randelzhofer/Forsthoff, supra note 202, Rn. 62–
72; Ulrich Forsthoff, Abschied von Sitztheorie, BB 7 (2002), 318. 
 209. Cf. Merkt, supra note 62, at 559–60 (questioning whether Europe is in 
fact susceptible to a race to the bottom due to the inverse relationship of 
company law regimes of the EC Member States, e.g., Germany’s strict co-
determination requirements are counterbalanced by weaker shareholder 
rights). 
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the already substantial harmonization of European company 
law leaves less room for permissive rules, even if there remain 
unharmonized, controversial issues.  This gives incorporators 
fewer incentives to think about foreign incorporation.  Second, 
the language barrier will make it less feasible for many small 
and medium sized enterprises to incorporate abroad.  Third, re-
incorporation or transfer of corporate domicile is not (yet) possi-
ble within the European Community, and therefore many cor-
porations are “locked in” in their home state.210 Fourth, there 
are no states in Europe that, like Delaware, substantially de-
pend for their income on franchise taxes.211  Terence L. Black-
burn, however, expects an even more vigorous race for laxity in 
Europe than in the U.S. 212  He argues against the background 
of the real seat theory, and claims that states will have a 
greater incentive to compete, because they will be competing for 
the real seat of a corporation and the associated jobs and taxes, 
and not just for incorporation.213   
Be that as it may, any race for laxity — stronger than in the 
U.S. or weaker — is regarded with suspicion in the EC.214  Cer-
  
 210. German company law treats a corporate decision to transfer the corpo-
rate domicile to another state as a decision to liquidate the corporation.  Even 
if the new state accepts the transfer and acknowledges continuing legal per-
sonality (i.e., disregards the German treatment of the transfer decision as 
dissolving the corporation), tax obstacles remain. German tax law will impose 
a very substantial liquidation tax which would be prohibitive of a transfer of 
corporate domicile. § 12 KÖRPERSCHAFTSTEUERGESETZ (German Corporate Tax 
Law).  
 211. See Merkt, supra note 62, at 564–65. 
 212. Blackburn, supra note 38, at 89.  See also Clark D. Stith, Federalism 
and Company Law, A “Race to the Bottom” in the European Community, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1581, 1587 (1991). 
 213. Blackburn, supra note 38, at 89–91. 
 214. See Bundesgerichtshof, BB 22 (2000), 1106 (1107); Catherine Barnard, 
Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European 
Union from Delaware, EUR. L. REV. 2000, 25(1), 57; Pedro Cabral & Patricia 
Cunha, “Presumed Innocent:” Companies and the Exercise of the Right of Es-
tablishment under Community Law, EUR. L. REV. 2000, 25(2), 157, 164; Max 
Göttsche, Das Centros-Urteil des EuGH und seine Auswirkungen , DEUTSCHES 
STEUERRECHT 34 (1999), 1403 (1404); Eva-Maria Kieninger, 
Niederlassungsfreiheit als Rechtswahlfreiheit, ZGR 5 (1999), 724, 747; 
Kindler, supra note 207, at 1993; Kindler, supra note 196, Rn. 269–72; Walter 
Kolvenbach, EEC Company Law Harmonization and Worker Participation, 11 
U. PA. J. INT ’L BUS. L. 709, 712 (1990); Eva Micheler, The Impact of the Cen-
tros Case on Europe’s Company Laws, COMPANY LAWYER 2000, 21(6), 179, 182; 
Paul J. Omar, Centros Revisited: Assessing the Impact on Corporate Organisa-
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tainly, the U.S. example shows that the Delaware Effect does 
not necessarily cripple an economy and might in the end adopt 
beneficial rules for shareholders due to an active market for 
corporate control.215  Still, this point falls short with respect to 
the EC.  There is no active European market for corporate con-
trol, and even if there were, the European perception of corpo-
rate law does not focus on shareholder value alone.216  It puts 
significant emphasis on other stakeholders, such as employees 
and creditors, as well and seeks to protect them in their own 
right and not as a reflex of shareholder protection.217  Accord-
ingly, the EC Treaty, in its Article 44(2)(g), expressly provides 
for measures “coordinating to the necessary extent the safe-
guards which, for the protection of the interests of members 
and other [sic], are required by Member States of companies or 
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout 
the Community.”218  The following sections will describe how 
foreign corporations are dealt with in Europe in order to pre-
vent or mitigate the problems identified above. 
C. Qualification in Europe 
U.S. qualification statutes address two main issues: the issue 
of disclosure, and the issue of service of process and exercise of 
jurisdiction.  European primary law219 guarantees foreign cor-
porations the right of establishment in another Member 
  
tion in Europe, INT’L COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL L. REV. 407, 413 (2000); G. H. 
Roth, supra note 206, at 861; Wouters, supra note 195, at 132. Cf. Merkt, su-
pra note 62, at 546–49. From an American point of view, compare Stith, supra 
note 212, at 1612 (race to the bottom in the EC “undesirable under any theory 
of the firm”). 
 215. See sources cited supra note 66.  
 216. See Merkt, supra note 62, at 559. 
 217. Cf. id. at 554–60 (arguing that a one dimensional focus on shareholder 
value is a necessary condition for any competition for companies). 
 218. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY , Nov. 10, 1997, art. 
44(2)(g), O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) (emphasis added) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. For 
the legislative reasons for this provision, see Alfred F. Conard, The European 
Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2153–
62 (1991). 
 219. I.e., law embodied in the EC TREATY as opposed to secondary law en-
acted under the EC TREATY   (directives and regulations). 
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State.220  Unlike in the U.S., a Member State can therefore not 
exclude a foreign corporation altogether from its market, and a 
state’s ability to admit it under conditions are at best limited.  
Still, European law recognizes the importance of making infor-
mation on corporations available and enabling third parties to 
serve process on a corporation.   
Thus, freedom of establishment does not, as a practical mat-
ter, mean that a foreign corporation can enjoy greater freedom 
and immunities than domestic corporations.  In fact, the practi-
cal differences between U.S. and European law are minimal.  
Foreign corporations in Europe have to be admitted uncondi-
tionally, but they are nevertheless required to qualify.  In the 
U.S., foreign corporations can be excluded from a state’s terri-
tory altogether or admitted under conditions, yet it appears 
that an exclusion never occurs and the conditions actually im-
posed do not amount to more than qualification, i.e., they are no 
real burden.   
It should be noted, though, that the European system works 
entirely on the European government level, whereas the U.S. 
system is based on interaction between the federal and the 
state government levels.  In Europe, admission is required by 
primary European law and qualification is required by secon-
dary European law in the form of a directive transformed into 
the relevant national law.  In the U.S., by contrast, federal con-
stitutional law enables states to exclude foreign corporations or 
admit them under conditions, and state laws use that freedom 
in a way that virtually guarantees access to foreign corpora-
tions.   
  
 220. EC TREATY arts. 43, 48. Article 48 limits this right, however, to 
“[c]ompanies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State 
and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the Community.”  U.S. corporations can therefore not rely on 
it. 
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1. Disclosure 
The Disclosure Directive221 contains the most important 
European disclosure requirements.222  It applies both to public 
limited companies and private limited liability companies223 and 
provides that certain kinds of information must be disclosed in 
the state of incorporation and that company letterheads and 
forms must indicate where this information can be found.224  
This is of little help to a third party who deals with a foreign 
corporation, since foreign registers are not easily available and 
— even if they are available online — they are in a foreign lan-
guage.  It may be acceptable to refer a third party to informa-
tion that is only available in the state of incorporation if the 
foreign corporation conducted a single transaction in the host 
state.  But in the case of continuous transactions, of “doing 
business,” in the host state, this scheme would provide insuffi-
cient protection for third parties.   
The laws of the EC Member States generally require that all 
corporations and partnerships must disclose the establishment 
of branches and provide a competent authority with certain 
kinds of information, and these “qualification laws” also apply 
to foreign corporations.225  They are, however, not completely 
national in character because they are based on the European 
Branch Directive,226 which harmonizes and imposes standards 
of qualification throughout Europe.   
The Branch Directive deals with the above mentioned infor-
mation deficit that occurs when foreign corporations continu-
  
 221. First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of 
safeguards, which for the protection of the interests of members and others, 
are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Community, 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. 41 [hereinafter 
Disclosure Directive]. 
 222. Id. arts. 2–4. 
 223. See id. art. 1.  The public limited company and the private limited li-
ability company are roughly analogous to the U.S. publicly traded corporation 
and the closely-held corporation, respectively. 
 224. Id. arts. 2–4. 
 225. See, e.g., §§ 13–13h HGB (German Commercial Code). 
 226. Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concern-
ing disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State 
by certain types of company governed by the law of another State, 1989 O.J. 
(L 395) 36–39 [hereinafter Branch Directive]. 
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ously conduct business within a host state, and it applies to 
“branches” of foreign corporations opened in another Member 
State.227  The directive itself does not define what a branch is.  
But given the definition of the word branch in other directives 
as a “place of business”228 or “permanent presence,”229 and its 
established definition in German law as a geographically sepa-
rate part of an enterprise that permanently conducts business 
independently of the main office and that has the necessary or-
ganizational means to do so,230 it becomes clear that “branch” 
and “doing business” are functionally equivalent.   
The Branch Directive requires the Member States to provide 
for compulsory disclosure of the address of the branch, its ac-
tivities, the register in which the information disclosed in the 
state of incorporation is kept, the name and legal form of the 
company and the name of the branch, if different, the appoint-
ment, termination of office and particulars of the persons who 
are authorized to represent the company in dealings with third 
parties and legal proceedings, the winding-up of the company, 
certain accounting documents, and the closure of the branch.231  
Member States may additionally choose to provide for the sub-
mission of the signature of the persons authorized to represent 
the company,232 the instruments of constitution of the company 
in a certified translation,233 an attestation from the register re-
  
 227. Id. art. 1(1). Companies means the forms of companies to which the 
Disclosure Directive applies, i.e., both public limited companies and limited 
companies.  Id. 
 228. Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in 
the securities field, art. 1(8), 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, 32 (“branch shall mean a 
place of business”); Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amend-
ing Directive 77/780/EEC, art. 1(3), 1989 O. J. (L 386) 1, 3. 
 229. Directive 2001/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 March 2001 on the reorganisation and winding-up of insurance undertak-
ings, art. 2(b), 2001 O.J. (L 110) 28, 31 (“‘branch’ means any permanent pres-
ence”).  
 230. Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, NJW-RR 17 (1992), 1062 (1063); 
Klaus J. Hopt, in: Baumbach/Hopt, HGB, § 13, Rn. 3. See also Peter Kindler, 
Neue Offenlegungspflichten für Zweigniederlassungen ausländischer 
Kapitalgesellschaften, NJW 51 (1993), 3301 (3303). 
 231. Branch Directive, supra note 226, art. 2(1). 
 232. Id. art. 2(2)(a). 
 233. Id. art. 4. 
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lating to the existence of the company,234 and certain informa-
tion on security interests in the company’s property.235 
This leads to the same extent of disclosure as provided by the 
U.S. qualification statutes.  The sanction for non-compliance is, 
however, less drastic than in the U.S.  Whereas U.S. law denies 
a non-complying foreign corporation access to state courts or 
even declares contracts unenforceable, which can lead to a sub-
stantial economic loss, the Branch Directive leaves it up to the 
Member States to provide for “appropriate penalties” for failure 
to disclose.236  German law imposes a maximum “coercive fine” 
of €5,000 on non-complying corporations that can be reapplied 
until the corporation complies.237 The fine is administered by 
the courts keeping the company register, which can act on their 
own motion.238 It is doubtful whether this kind of penalty is ac-
tually appropriate because it provides only an ex post remedy 
that usually comes too late for third parties.  Moreover, there is 
no incentive for voluntary compliance, because even if the court 
acts and threatens to impose the fine, the corporation can — 
due to the coercive nature of the fine — easily escape it by then 
complying immediately.239 It is dubious whether this situation 
constitutes an insufficient transformation of the directive by 
Germany.  The Daihatsu case suggests that it is not,240 although 
one could argue that third parties rely more on ex ante  compli-
ance in so far as Branch Directive information is concerned and, 
therefore, a more forceful penalty, which gives corporations in-
centives for voluntary compliance, is required. 
2. Procedure 
As we have seen, the Branch Directive addresses exclusively 
issues of disclosure, whereas procedural issues such as the ser-
vice of process are not dealt with.  Enabling service of process 
on foreign corporations and the exercise of jurisdiction over 
  
 234. Id. art. 2(2)(c). 
 235. Id. art. 2(2)(d). 
 236. Id. art. 12. 
 237. § 14 HGB (German Commercial Code).  
 238. Id.; Hopt, supra note 230, § 14, Rn. 3.  
 239. Hopt, supra note 230, § 14, Rn. 3. 
 240. See Case C–97/96, Verband Deutscher Daihatsu-Händler eV v. Dai-
hatsu Deutschland GmbH, 1997 E.C.R. I–6843, ¶ 17–20. For commentary, see 
case note by Wolfgang Schön, JURISTEN ZEITUNG  4 (1998), 194. 
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them constitutes the ‘second pillar’ of U.S. qualification stat-
utes.  This pillar, however, is not missing in European law; it is 
simply unnecessary in the context of corporate law since it is 
dealt with in a broader context by the Brussels-I-Regulation,241 
which replaced, as of March 1, 2002, the 1968 EEC Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters among the Member States.242  
The Brussels-I-Regulation applies to civil and commercial 
matters243 and establishes as a general rule that “persons domi-
ciled in a Member state shall, whatever their nationality, be 
sued in the courts of that Member State.”244 A corporation is 
domiciled “at the place where it has its: (a) statutory seat, or (b) 
central administration, or (c) principal place of business.”245 Yet, 
even though this already subjects corporations to three possible 
jurisdictions, it does not ensure that a corporation can be sued 
wherever it does business, i.e., wherever it has a branch.  This 
gap is closed by an exception to the general rule, which permits 
a person to be sued “as regards a dispute arising out of the op-
erations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the 
courts for the place in which the branch, agency or other estab-
lishment is situated.”246  Service of process in another EC Mem-
ber State is effected pursuant to the rules of a special Council 
regulation.247  Thus, at least in as far as the external affairs of a 
foreign corporation are concerned, the European regulations 
  
 241. Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels-I-Regulation]. 
 242. Brussels-I-Regulation, supra note 241, art. 68. There are no substantial 
differences between the new Brussels-I-Regulation and the old Brussels Con-
vention. For details on the Brussels Convention, see REINHOLD GEIMER & 
ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, EUROPÄISCHES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT, KOMMENTAR ZUM 
EUGVÜ UND ZUM LUGANO-ÜBEREINKOMMEN (1997). Since these treaties  re-
main in force with respect to non-members of the EC, the following remarks 
also apply in relation to these countries. 
 243. Brussels-I-Regulation, supra note 241, art. 1(1). 
 244. Id. art. 2(1).  Article 3(1) establishes an exception to this rule whereby 
domiciliaries of Member States may be sued in courts of other Member States 
so long as certain rules are followed, as laid out in Articles 2–7.  See infra note 
246. 
 245. Id. art. 60(1). 
 246. Id. art. 5(5). 
 247. Council regulation (EC) 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the 
Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial 
matters, 2000 O. J. (L 160) 37. 
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achieve the same goals of ensuring jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations as the U.S. qualification statutes. 
With respect to the internal affairs of a corporation, exclusive 
jurisdiction regardless of domicile is granted:  
in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the 
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or 
other legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, 
or of the validity of the decisions of their organs, [to] the courts 
of the Member State in which the company, legal person or as-
sociation has its seat.  In order to determine that seat, the 
court shall apply its rules of private international law. 248   
At first sight this resembles the early history of the U.S. sys-
tem, where the courts refused to exercise jurisdiction over the 
internal affairs of a foreign corporation.249 Yet, this is only par-
tially true, because the place of incorporation/real seat problem 
returns through the backdoor due to the last sentence, which 
refers the determination of a corporation’s seat to the private 
international law of the forum.  This means that the courts of 
an EC Member State that adheres to the place of incorporation 
theory will have no jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a 
foreign corporation.  The same is generally true for the courts of 
an EC Member State that applies the real seat theory, but they 
have a loophole for pseudo-foreign corporations over which they 
can exercise jurisdiction even in matters relating to their inter-
nal affairs.   
The U.S. rule, which is based on the forum non conveniens 
doctrine, has the advantage of greater flexibility and of greater 
domestic control over foreign corporations.250 Yet, the European 
rule also makes sense.  It applies only to a very limited number 
of internal affairs, so that the above distinction between inter-
nal and external affairs is more descriptive than doctrinally 
accurate; this limits the adverse effects on control and flexibil-
ity.  It also provides a clear statutory rule, which will foster uni-
  
 248. Brussels-I-Regulation, supra note 241, art. 22(2). 
 249. See supra note 58. 
 250. For example, under the U.S. system, the courts of the host state can 
exercise jurisdiction regarding the question of dissolution of a foreign corpora-
tion, whereas in Europe the courts of a state following the place of incorpora-
tion theory would never have jurisdiction on that question, and the courts of a 
state following the real seat theory would have jurisdiction only in the case of 
a pseudo-foreign corporation. 
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form application and certainty for the corporations.  Finally, it 
reduces the chances of positive jurisdictional conflicts in cases 
in which there is an inherent need for a single, uniform deci-
sion, i.e., in decisions affecting third parties. 
3. “Constitutional” Aspects 
In Europe, qualification statutes do not pose any “constitu-
tional” problems on the ‘federal,’ European level.  Although the 
relevant disclosure provisions are national law, they are never-
theless based on European directives.251  From a theoretical 
point of view, this provides for European “approval” of the na-
tional laws so that they cannot successfully be challenged as 
being in breach of European law, so long as the EC Member 
States have correctly transformed the directives into national 
law.252 From a practical point of view, this system creates a uni-
formity that prevents discrimination and provides a level play-
ing field for all corporations throughout Europe.   
The same is true with regards to the procedural issue.  The 
laws already have European approval and, since the relevant 
provisions are European regulations, which have direct effect in 
all Member States,253 there is no possibility of incorrect trans-
formation into national law.   
D. Outreach in Europe 
European Community law does not contain outreach statutes 
and the same seems to be true for the laws of most of the EC 
Member States.254  There are, however, features in European 
company law that resemble outreach statutes: the real seat the-
ory on the Member State level and harmonization on the Euro-
pean level.   
1. Real seat theory 
The first feature is found at the Member State level: many 
Member States adhere to the real seat theory, which subjects 
  
 251. E.g., Disclosure Directive, supra note 221. 
 252. EC TREATY art. 249(3). The possibility of the directives themselves 
being in breach of the EC TREATY  can be neglected here. 
 253. EC TREATY art. 249(2). 
 254. But see infra Part VI.B. on the Danish and Dutch laws on pseudo-
foreign corporations. 
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corporations to the laws of the state in which the corporation 
has its real seat.255  In theory, this does not have to be the forum 
state; it is logically possible, although unlikely, that, for exam-
ple, a German court will have to apply French law to a corpora-
tion incorporated in Britain but with its real seat in France.256  
With this theoretical caveat in mind, it can be stated that the 
real seat theory leads to a very drastic outreach that is not lim-
ited to selected issues of substantial law deemed crucial, and 
effectively leads to the elimination of the corporation “at the 
border,” i.e., before it can even enter the host state.257  This “out-
reach effect” is intentional: the real seat theory was adopted in 
continental Europe in the 19th century in order to prevent 
corporations from taking advantage of more liberal laws in Bel-
gium and Britain.258 
The differences to U.S. outreach statutes are substantial.  
Even if one adheres to the more moderate version of the real 
seat theory, which does not regard a foreign corporation with a 
real seat in the forum state as a nullity but re-qualifies it as a 
domestic partnership-like company,259 it is not qualification but 
transformation against the members’ will as expressed in their 
company contract.  Moreover, the real seat theory does not ap-
ply only to pseudo-foreign corporations or to corporations doing 
most of their business in the forum state.  A corporation incor-
porated in Britain, having its real seat in France, and doing 
most of its business in Germany is easily conceivable and would 
have to be treated according to French law by a German court.  
This also goes too far from the point of view of a state interest 
analysis, since it is not apparent which significant interests of 
the forum state are served if its courts apply the real seat the-
ory to a corporation with its real seat in a third state.  Finally, 
  
 255. See supra Part V.A. 
 256. See supra note 200. 
 257. See Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa, ZHR 
154 (1990), 325 (334–42); Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Niederlassungsfreiheit: 
Diskriminierungs- oder Beschränkungsverbot, DB 51/52 (1990), 2573 (2577–
78). 
 258. Carney, supra note 66, at 316; David Charny, Competition Among Ju-
risdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules:  An American Perspective on 
the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities , 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
423, 428 (1991); Latty, supra note 2, at 166 n.130; Merkt, supra note 62, at 
560–61. 
 259. See supra note 203. 
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in Europe the real seat theory is not applied by all EC Member 
States, which creates disparities in protection and friction be-
tween the different national systems. 
2. Harmonization 
The other “outreach feature” in European corporate law can 
be found at the European Community law level.  The harmoni-
zation efforts pursuant to the above mentioned Article 44 of the 
EC Treaty that started in 1968 with the first company law di-
rective, the Disclosure Directive,260 have led to a functional con-
vergence between the corporation laws of the different Member 
States.261 In the harmonized areas of company law, Member 
States are obliged to adapt their laws to the directives so that 
issues will be resolved the same way throughout Europe.262 
These directives, which provide for disclosure, protection 
against the ultra vires doctrine, and uniform rules on the nul-
lity of companies,263 capital maintenance,264 accounting rules,265 
merger and division of corporations,266 etc.,267 ensure that in 
their respective areas a level playing field for corporations ex-
  
 260. See supra note 221. 
 261. For an overview of the European provisions on corporation law, see 
Conard, supra note 218, at 2162–67. 
 262. See EC TREATY art. 249(3). 
 263. Disclosure Directive, supra note 221, arts. 2, 3, 9, 10. 
 264. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordina-
tion of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and 
others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of 
the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of 
public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their 
capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 
[hereinafter Capital Directive]. 
 265. Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 
54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 
1978 O.J. (L 222) 11; Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 
based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, 1983 
O.J. (L 193). 
 266. Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Article 
54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability compa-
nies, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36; Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 
1982 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public 
limited liability companies, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47. 
 267. See the various directives reprinted by MARCUS LUTTER, EUROPÄISCHES 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT (1996); D.D. PRENTICE , EEC DIRECTIVES ON COMPANY 
LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (1991). 
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ists.  In the context of state competition, it can therefore be said 
that European law draws the bottom line at which a race to the 
bottom would have to stop by establishing certain minimum 
standards.  Moreover, in some areas it also imposes a limit on 
how strictly a state may regulate by imposing maximum stan-
dards as well.268 
However, this system still has substantial gaps because im-
portant European legislation has not been passed yet.  In par-
ticular, the adoption of the proposed  Fifth Directive concerning 
the internal structure of corporations,269 the proposed directive 
on take-over bids270 and the proposed directive on the transfer of 
corporate domicile271 is needed to close these gaps.  And even 
with these directives adopted, European law will not achieve 
the degree of uniformity of U.S. corporation law. 
3. “Constitutional” Aspects  
From a “constitutional” point of view the harmonization issue 
is not problematic since the national laws are based on the 
European directives.272 The real seat theory, however, is most 
problematic since it is — as mentioned above — doubtful 
whether its dramatic consequences are compatible with the 
  
 268. For a discussion of this aspect with respect to the Capital Directive, see 
generally HENRIK DRINKUTH, DIE KAPITALRICHTLINIE — MINDEST- ODER 
HÖCHSTNORM? (1998). 
 269. Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive founded on article 54 (3) (g) of 
the EEC Treaty concerning the structure of public limited companies and the 
powers and obligations of their organs, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2.  See Second 
Amendment to the proposal for a Fifth Council Directive based on Article 54 
of the EEC Treaty concerning the structure of public limited companies and 
the powers and obligations of their organs, 1991 O.J. (C 7) 4. 
 270. Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on 
company law concerning takeover bids, 1996 O.J. (C 162) 5.  See Amended 
proposal for a thirteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on com-
pany law concerning takeover bids, 1997 O.J. (C 378) 10; Commission Opinion 
pursuant to Article 251 (2) (c) of the EC Treaty on the European Parliament’s 
amendments to the Council’s common position regarding the proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on company law con-
cerning takeover bids, COM (01) 77 final. 
 271. Proposal for a 14th European Parliament and Council Directive on 
Company Law on the Transfer of the Registered Office of a Company from one 
Member State to Another with a Change of Applicable Law — Commission 
Proposal, reprinted in ZIP 39 (1997), 1721 [hereinafter Proposed Transfer of 
Corporate Domicile Directive]. 
 272. See supra Part V.C.3. 
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freedom of establishment guaranteed by the EC Treaty.  The 
ECJ will most likely advance the law in a direction of greater 
flexibility and security for corporations and their members.273 
4. Summary 
To sum up, outreach in Europe rests on two pillars, the real 
seat theory and harmonization, both of which are not very sta-
ble.  The real seat theory applies only in some of the EC Mem-
ber States and is likely to be substantially restricted by the 
ECJ, if not altogether declared incompatible with the EC 
Treaty.  Harmonization, on the other hand, is incomplete and 
leaves substantial gaps. 
E. Remaining Problems: Focus of the European Discussion 
What are these substantial gaps?  In other words, what are 
the public policy issues that Member States that adhere to the 
real seat theory wish to protect?  From the European law view-
point, the only public policy issues acceptable are those that 
have not already been dealt with by European law.274 In all 
other respects, the relevant directives define the necessary ex-
tent of protection.  If the directive imposes both a minimum and 
maximum standard, states are not permitted to deviate from 
that standard at all, neither for domestic nor for foreign corpo-
rations.  But even if the directive only prescribes a minimum 
standard and leaves it open to the Member States to set higher 
standards in their national law, that does not mean that these 
Member States have a legitimate interest in applying these 
higher standards to foreign corporations because the directives 
have rendered the relevant “safeguards equivalent throughout 
the community.”275 Given these considerations, there seem to be 
two crucial issues remaining: corporate governance and mini-
mum capital requirements. 
  
 273. See supra Part V.B. 
 274. Cf. Wouters, supra note 195, at 121–22 (discussing harmonization and 
national conflicts rules). 
 275. EC TREATY art. 44 (2)(g). 
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1. Corporate Governance: Co-determination 
The Member States recently managed to agree on the Statute 
for the European Company (Societas Europaea, SE) [“SE”],276 a 
project that had taken over thirty years to negotiate.  This stat-
ute (in the form of a European regulation) allows the formation 
of a business corporation under European law.277  Thus, the EC 
Member States, which all had to agree on this particular form 
of business corporation, had to find a means of accommodating 
different ideas about the internal organization of a corporation.  
The way in which problems are resolved in the context of this 
statute is a good indicator of the issues that the EC Member 
States deem crucial, because the SE is likely to become an im-
portant feature in European company law, since it greatly fa-
cilitates European corporate take-overs, easily permits the 
transfer of corporate domicile, and is especially attractive for 
large national concerns. 
The question of a two-tier or one-tier board structure, which 
was still open due to the unsuccessful structure directive, was 
resolved in favor of giving the corporation the option to choose 
between the two possibilities.278 This indicates that these two 
options are deemed equivalent by the EC Member States or at 
least that the choice of the “foreign structure” is not considered 
harmful to their public policy.  It could certainly be argued that 
this was a political compromise rather than a substantive cor-
porate governance decision, but that would not change the legal 
implication that these options are deemed equivalent.  More-
over, whereas the Member States specifically provided that “in 
view of the specific Community character of an SE, the ‘real 
seat’ arrangement adopted by this Regulation in respect of SEs 
is without prejudice to Member States’ laws and does not pre-
empt any choices to be made for other Community texts on 
  
 276. Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for 
a European Company (SE), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 [hereinafter SE-Statute]. 
 277. Id. art. 1. 
 278. SE-Statute, supra note 276, art. 38. The choice made by the SE has no 
effect on whether the SE will be subject to co-determination rules. See Council 
Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a 
European company with regard to the involvement of employees, art. 2(f), 
2001 O.J. (L 294) 22, 24 [hereinafter SE-Directive] (defining a special “repre-
sentative body,” which will exercise the employee’s rights). Cf. Meinhard 
Heinze, Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, ZGR 1 (2002), 66 (82–84). 
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company law,”279  EC Member States did not make a reservation 
restricting the implications of their — perhaps political — deci-
sion of granting the SE the option to choose between a two-tier 
or one-tier board structure, nor in any other respect. 
The crucial issue that kept delaying the adoption of the stat-
ute, was workers’ co-determination and the way it was dealt 
with demonstrates that there was no real consensus on this 
point.  The SE-Statute refers this question280 to a special direc-
tive, which in turn refers it primarily to negotiations between 
employees and the corporations participating in the formation 
of an SE.281  If the parties cannot reach an agreement within a 
certain period of time, default rules apply in some circum-
stances.282  In sum, these provisions are designed to preserve 
the status quo existing in the companies that form an SE, not to 
genuinely establish employees’ rights.283  This shows that coun-
tries that insist on co-determination as a matter of public policy 
have not retreated from their position.  European law acknowl-
edges this, and a special provision requires the Member States 
to prevent the “misuse of an SE for the purpose of depriving 
employees of rights to employee involvement or withholding 
such rights.”284 
Many of the other corporate law issues are dealt with accord-
ing to the laws of the EC Member States in which the SE has 
its registered office.285 This could mean either that the Member 
States do not attach any special importance to these issues or 
they regard the foreign laws as providing sufficient protection.  
Yet, the SE-Statute — as does the European Economic Interest 
  
 279. SE-Statute, supra note 276, recital (27).  Cf. id. art. 69(a) (five years 
after entry into force of the Regulation, the Commission is to submit a report 
on the application of the Regulation and proposals for amendments, including 
an analysis of the appropriateness of allowing the location of an SE’s head 
office and registered office in different Member States). 
 280. Id. arts. 1, 12.  
 281. SE-Directive, supra note 278, arts. 3–4. Cf. Heinze, supra note 278. 
 282. SE-Directive, supra note 278, arts. 5, 7. 
 283. Id. recital (7) (“If and when participation rights exist within one or 
more companies establishing an SE, they should be preserved through their 
transfer to the SE, once established, unless the parties decide otherwise.”). 
 284. Id. art. 11. 
 285. SE-Statute, supra note 276, arts. 4–5, 9. 
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Group Regulation286 — follows the real seat theory,287 which re-
duces the strength of this argument, since the Member States 
then in fact do not tolerate foreign law as far as these issues are 
concerned.  The Member States only agreed on a system that 
allows the transfer of the corporate domicile of an SE; they did 
not resolve issues of pseudo-foreign SEs.288 So even though the 
crucial issue was co-determination, it does not mean that the 
Member States will not insist on other public policies when 
pseudo-foreign corporations are involved.   
But this renvoi to national law oftentimes refers to national 
law as harmonized by European directives.289  Moreover, the 
remaining public policy issues were not important enough to 
further delay the adoption of the SE-Statute.  Since an SE will 
always be a multinational corporation that affects more than 
one country,290 the adoption of the SE-Statute shows that EC 
Member States trust each other’s laws to some extent.  This 
indicates that the issues referred back to national law are not 
all that important. 
2. Limited Liability and Minimum Capital: Internal v. External 
Affairs 
Nevertheless, the most important issue seems to be the 
minimum capital requirement.  The SE-Statute could only deal 
with it with respect to SEs and the Capital Directive, which 
  
 286. See Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), arts. 2(1), 5(b), 6, 12, 1985 O.J. (L 199) 
1–4. 
 287. See SE-Statute, supra note 276, art. 7; see also id. art. 9. Article 7 pro-
vides: “The registered office of an SE shall be located within the Community, 
in the same Member State as its head office. A Member State may in addition 
impose on SEs registered in its territory the obligation of locating their head 
office and their registered office in the same place.”  This cannot be changed 
by a later transfer of the corporate domicile.  See SE-Statute, supra note 276, 
art. 8(14). 
 288. This was not necessary since the SE-Statute ensures that the real seat 
and the corporate domicile always coincide.  See SE-Statute, supra note 276, 
art. 7. 
 289. See Christian Kersting, Societas Europaea: Gründung und 
Vorgesellschaft, DB 39 (2001), 2079 (2079). 
 290. SE-Statute, supra note 276, art. 2.  See Kersting, supra note 289, at 
2079; Marcus Lutter, Europäische Aktiengesellschaft – Rechtsfigur mit 
Zukunft?, BB 1 (2002), 1 (4); Günther Christian Schwarz, Zum Statut der 
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, ZIP 42 (2001), 1847 (1857–58). 
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requires a minimum capital of €25,000, applies only to public 
limited liability companies and not to limited companies. 291  
Therefore, a British “Limited Company” and an Irish “Private 
Company” are not required to have and maintain a minimum 
capital.  This creates a loophole for company founders.  The 
Danish founders of Centros Ltd. openly admitted that they in-
corporated the corporation in the U.K. in order to circumvent 
the Danish laws requiring a minimum capital, and the ECJ did 
not let the Danish authorities intervene.292 
The minimum capital requirement is closely related to the 
question of liability, since providing the company with a mini-
mum capital and maintaining it are seen as the “price” for lim-
ited liability.293  Unlike common law, civil law does not perceive 
limited liability to be based on an agreement among the share-
holders; it is essentially seen as a statutory departure from the 
general rule of joint and several liability for a joint economic 
undertaking — a privilege that is only granted contingent on 
the company being endowed with a minimum capital. 294  This 
makes it an external affair since it involves the right of third 
parties to enforce claims against the shareholders.  The close 
connection between the minimum capital requirement and lim-
ited liability is reflected in the sanctions for failure to comply.  
Without maintaining the statutory minimum capital, a com-
pany cannot be registered and thus can neither obtain legal 
personality nor can the members obtain limited liability.295  If 
the minimum capital is not maintained, this will frequently 
lead to some amount of personal liability for the members.296 
  
 291. Capital Directive, supra note 264, art. 6(1). 
 292. Case C–212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] 
E.C.R. I–1459. 
 293. Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ 80, 129 (136). See CHRISTIAN KERSTING, DIE 
VORGESELLSCHAFT IM EUROPÄISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT  24, 146 (2000). 
 294. See Companies Act, 1985, 33 Eliz. II, sec. 2 (Eng.). See also KERSTING , 
supra note 293, at 146. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories 
of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991) (arguing that limited liability 
should be seen as a contractual relationship between shareholders). The fact 
that limited liability is based on an agreement among the shareholders makes 
the internal affairs rule applicable. If limited liability is seen as a matter pe-
culiar to the relationship between the corporation or its shareholders and 
third parties, it would not come within the scope of the internal affairs rule.  
 295. See Capital Directive, supra note 264, art. 6(1). 
 296. For example, repayment of unlawful distributions to shareholders.  
Capital Directive, supra note 264, art. 16. 
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These limited liability aspects underlie the strong public pol-
icy that is expressed by some Member States’ minimum capital 
requirement.  This issue has not been resolved thus far, al-
though the European Commission did contemplate extending 
the scope of the Capital Directive to limited companies, which 
would have led to a minimum capital requirement for all corpo-
rations.297  However, the Commission also realized that such a 
proposal is likely to encounter strong opposition from the Mem-
ber States that do not require a minimum capital.298 
F. Summary 
U.S. law dealing with pseudo-foreign corporations exists 
mainly on the state level.  Both the conflict of laws rules and 
qualification and outreach statutes are state law.  The system 
works well in ensuring disclosure of information, that foreign 
corporations can effectively be sued in the host state, and that 
public policies of the host state can be enforced as against 
pseudo-foreign corporations.  It also has the advantages of uni-
formity of its basic features: the internal affairs rule, qualifica-
tion statutes, and a constitutional principle that corporations 
should not be subjected to inconsistent sets of rules.  However, 
the system lacks predictability.  The questions of when a trans-
action involves interstate rather than intrastate commerce, or 
when the outreach statutes apply, or the constitutionality of the 
outreach statutes do not have clear answers.  The first two 
questions in particular seem to be answered on a case-by-case 
basis.  This may provide flexibility desirable for courts, but can 
prove costly for enterprises.   
The European system also operates on the Member State 
level, although its foundations are based on European law.  It 
works well as far as qualification and the exercise of jurisdiction 
over foreign corporations are concerned.  The system lacks uni-
formity, however; the choice of law rules differ in the Member 
States and harmonization is incomplete, especially with regards 
to co-determination and minimum capital requirements.  It is 
not unlikely that corporations will be subjected to inconsistent 
  
 297. EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION , STUDIE ÜBER DIE ERWEITERUNG DES 
ANWENDUNGSBEREICHS DER ZWEITEN RICHTLINIE AUF GESELLSCHAFTEN ANDERER 
RECHTSFORM (1993) [hereinafter KOMMISSION STUDIE]. 
 298. Id. at 25. 
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rules.  Moreover, it is unclear if and in how far Member States 
can enforce their public policies as against pseudo-foreign cor-
porations.  The real seat theory seems to be  only of limited use, 
if any, in that respect. 
Altogether, the U.S. example shows that public policy issues 
can be protected, even in the context of a Delaware Effect cre-
ated by adherence to the place of incorporation theory.  This 
article has also described European law’s functionally equiva-
lent rules and explored their weaknesses.  The next section will 
try to devise a statutory solution for the EC. 
VI. A SUGGESTED STATUTORY SOLUTION 
The existing body of law described above has apparently been 
sufficient thus far to prevent the problems associated with for-
eign corporations from getting out of hand.  The real seat the-
ory, however, is too efficient and unnecessarily drastic in its 
effects.299  It makes little sense to replace it with another “the-
ory” that would lack the certainty and clarity of a statute and 
the uniform application of which could therefore not be guaran-
teed.  Thus, a statutory solution will have to avoid the harsh 
effects of the real seat theory and take a “softer” approach.   
A. Further Harmonization 
One way of dealing with the necessary replacement or 
attenuation of the real seat theory could be further 
harmonization of company law.300  The passage of the Fifth 
Structure Directive,301 the 13th Take-over directive ,302 the 14th 
Transfer of domicile Directive ,303 the extension of the 2nd 
Capital Directive to limited companies,304 and broadening the 
scope of the SE-Directive on co-determination305 would lead to 
  
 299. Commentators have interpreted the Centros decision as holding that 
the Danish reaction to the circumvention of the minimum capital requirement 
was disproportionate.  See, e.g., Randelzhofer/Forsthoff, supra note 202, Rn. 
67; W. H. Roth, supra note 207, at 320; Wouters, supra note 195, at 137. 
 300. This seems to be the approach preferred by Stith, supra note 212, at 
1587, who also suggests keeping up the real seat theory.  Id. at 1618. 
 301. Supra note 269. 
 302. Supra note 270. 
 303. Supra note 271. 
 304. Cf. Wolfgang Schön, Gesellschafter-, Gläubiger- und Anlegerschutz im 
Europäischen Bilanzrecht, ZGR 4–5 (2000), 706 (726). 
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Directive on co-determination305 would lead to such a degree of 
uniformity in European company law that the problems associ-
ated with pseudo-foreign corporations would no longer be an 
issue.  There would be no need to worry about whether to apply 
the law of the host state or the state of incorporation, because 
the result would basically be the same.  This scenario does not 
seem to be utopian from a political point of view, given the fact 
that politically problematic issues, such as co-determination, 
have been resolved in the SE-Statute.  It is also conceivable to 
apply the solutions found for the SE mutatis mutandis to the 
proposed directives as well.  However, there are still three 
points that substantially question the practicability of this ap-
proach.  
First, a directive permitting re-incorporation of corporations 
within the EC will probably increase the number of pseudo-
foreign corporations and lead to additional problems.  Once ex-
isting corporations, which are “locked in” at the moment, are 
free to move, one can expect decisions on re-incorporation that 
are most controversial with the stakeholders and will certainly 
have political ramifications.306 
Second, further harmonization would work only in relation to 
EC Member States.  With third states, another solution would 
have to be adopted.  Yet, it does not make much sense to apply 
different conflict of laws rules to EC Member States and third 
nations.307  
Third, even if the issue of co-determination can be settled as 
in the SE-Statute and the accompanying directive, there is one 
crucial problem that further harmonization will probably not be 
able to deal with: the minimum capital requirement as the focal 
point of European discussion.  It is unlikely that the EC Mem-
ber States will agree to introduce a mandatory minimum capi-
tal requirement for limited companies.  The European Commis-
sion has proposed it in a study,308 but the idea does not seem to 
have been pursued any further.  One could argue, however, that 
  
 305. Supra note 278. 
 306. Societates Europaeas will be able to re-incorporate throughout Europe 
once this company form is available in 2004. It is unlikely, though, that given 
the structure of these companies and the way they will have to be formed, the 
occurrence of a pseudo-foreign SE will not even be possible. 
 307. Cf. Sandrock, supra note 62, at 252; Sandrock, supra note 206, at 1344. 
 308. KOMMISSION STUDIE, supra note 297, at 25–28. 
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this is not really a crucial point given that third parties could be 
protected by informing them of the fact that a corporation does 
not maintain a minimum capital.309 On the other hand, a mini-
mum capital requirement is also a bonding device that aligns 
incentives and can prevent moral hazard.310 Its importance is 
underscored by the fact that large creditors compensate for a 
lacking minimum capital requirement by imposing debt cove-
nants on their debtor, which essentially serve the same func-
tion.311 The argument basically leads back to the question 
whether a minimum capital requirement makes sense in the 
first place.   
However, this is exactly the question that national legislators 
have answered differently and that the European legislator is 
currently unable to resolve.  It can certainly be said that the 
European tendency is strongly in favor of a minimum capital 
requirement as a price for limited liability312 because it can be 
found both in the Capital Directive313 and the SE-Statute,314 as 
well as the proposed statute for a European Private Com-
  
 309. See Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors versus Capital 
Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1165, 1188 (2001); Eilis Ferran, Creditors’ Interests and “Core” Com-
pany Law, COMPANY LAWYER 1999, 20(10), 314, 318; Micheler, supra note 214, 
at 179.  Cf. Conard, supra note 218, at 2174 (critiquing the persuasiveness of 
this argument in as far as the situation in Europe is concerned).  On the more 
general issue of who should bear the cost of obtaining information on foreign 
law, see W. H. Roth, supra note 207, at 333. 
 310. See Conard, supra note 218, at 2174; HENRY HANSMANN , THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 56 (1996). 
 311. William W. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a 
Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 108, 140 (1989); John C. Coffee, 
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. 
L.J. 1495, 1512–15, 1519–21 (1990); Enriques & Macey, supra note 309, at 
1188; Helen A. Garten, Market Discipline Revisited, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 
187, 199–209 (1995); Wolfgang Schön, Wer schützt den Kapitalschutz?, ZHR 
166 (2002), 1 (4); Schön, supra note 304, at 725 (arguing that debt covenants 
are less efficient because they involve transaction costs, do not protect small 
creditors, and could subject a corporation to inconsistent regulations). 
 312. But see the opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Centros, who, 
citing Charny, supra note 258, at 424, considers competition among the Mem-
ber States to be necessary absent harmonization. Opinion of Advocate General 
La Pergola, Case 212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] 
E.C.R. I–1459, 1479 n.49. Contra Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 154, n.24. 
 313. Capital Directive, supra note 264, art. 6(1). 
 314. SE-Statute, supra note 276, art. 4. 
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pany.315  Moreover, the European Economic Interest Grouping 
that does not have a minimum capital requirement also has no 
limited liability.316  Yet, the Capital Directive still does not ap-
ply to limited companies.  Further harmonization therefore does 
not seem to be a practicable option. 
B. Member State Rules 
Thus, the question is: could EC Member States pass outreach 
statutes, which require pseudo-foreign corporations to maintain 
a minimum capital and adopt co-determination?  
Over a year before Centros was decided, the Netherlands en-
acted the 1997 Pro-Forma Foreign Companies Act,317 which pro-
vides that pseudo-foreign corporations318 have to be registered 
in the Netherlands, contains provisions on disclosure,319 
requires the registration and maintenance of a minimum capi-
tal,320 and holds the directors personally liable for failure to do 
so.321 
In a reaction to Centros, Denmark has enacted a tax law that 
requires foreign corporations to put up a guarantee of 
DKK110,000 (Danish kronos) (the equivalent of the minimum 
capital of DKK125,000 less a discount of DKK15,000) or show 
that the value of its net assets is equal to that amount.322  Com-
  
 315. See generally VORSCHLÄGE FÜR EINE EUROPÄISCHE PRIVATGESELLSCHAFT 
(Jeanne Boucourechliev & Peter Hommelhoff eds., 1999).  
 316. For further detail, see KERSTING, supra note 293, at 250. 
 317. The Pro Forma Foreign Companies Act  (Wet op de formeel 
buitenlandse vennootschappen) of December 17, 1997 entered into force Janu-
ary 1, 1998, Stb. 1997, 697 (Neth.) [hereinafter Pro Forma Companies Act]. 
See Werner F. Ebke, Centros — Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 623, 644–688 (2000); Levinus Timmerman, Das niederländische 
Gesellschaftsrecht im Umbruch, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MARCUS LUTTER 173, 183–
85 (Uwe H. Schneider et al. eds., 2000). 
 318. Defined in Article 1 of the Pro Forma Foreign Companies Act as a com-
pany doing business “entirely or almost entirely” in the Netherlands and hav-
ing “[no] further real tie” with its state of incorporation. Pro Forma Foreign 
Companies Act, art. 1.  
 319. Id. arts. 2–3. 
 320. Id. art. 4(1)–(2). 
 321. Id. art. 4(4). 
 322. For further details see Søren Friis Hansen, From C 212 to L 212 — 
Centros Revisited, 2 E.B.O.R. 141 (2001). 
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pliance with these requirements is a prerequisite to doing busi-
ness in Denmark.323  
On a more general level, such statutes could also provide for 
joint and several liability of shareholders of a pseudo-foreign 
corporation that does not maintain a minimum capital either 
according to the laws of the host state or according to the Capi-
tal Directive.  As regards co-determination, the statute would 
simply have to declare the corporate governance modifications 
for domestic corporations applicable to pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions as well.  To ensure that corporations are not faced with 
inconsistent rules applied to them by different states, i.e., to 
ensure that only one outreach statute applies, the definition of 
“pseudo-foreign” would have to be sufficiently narrow.   
Otto Sandrock, who conceived a “super-addition theory” in 
the context of the American outreach statutes, has suggested a 
similar, albeit non-statutory, concept.324  His idea is to generally 
apply the lex incorporationis  and to permit the stakeholders 
under certain circumstances to invoke cogent forum law that 
then replaces the law of the state of incorporation.325  This the-
ory, which had been widely rejected,326 has received new atten-
tion in the wake of the Centros  case.327  It avoids the drastic 
consequences of the real seat theory, while it safeguards the 
public policy of the host state.  It also has the additional advan-
tage of likely being more in compliance with Centros than any 
other theory.328  Moreover, the statutory approach taken by 
California and New York has worked in the U.S. and could be, 
at least at first sight, a model on which a European solution 
could be based.329  
  
 323. Id. at 150–52. 
 324. See Sandrock, supra note 62. 
 325. Id.; Otto Sandrock, Die Multinationalen Korporationen im 
Internationalen Privatrecht, in 18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHE N GESELLSCHAFT 
FÜR VÖLKERRECHT  169, 191 (1978). Compare the similar earlier proposal by 
Latty, supra note 2, at 159–62. 
 326. See, e.g., Grossfeld, supra note 193, Rn. 64, 69–70; Kindler, supra note 
196, Rn. 292–95. 
 327. See Buxbaum, supra note 8. 
 328. Sandrock, supra note 206, at 1343. 
 329. Despite his criticism, Grossfeld, supra note 193, Rn. 37, queries 
whether the super-addition theory could become the model for the European 
Community. 
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Yet, such a statute or such a theory would be incompatible 
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty.330 
To claim that they apply only to essentially national cases and 
not community cases would be no defense against an allegation 
of breach of the treaty.  Unlike in the U.S., where the dormant 
commerce clause does not protect corporations by virtue of their 
foreign incorporation but only when the corporation engages in 
interstate commerce,331 the mere fact that the corporation is 
incorporated in another Member State opens the way for appli-
cation of the EC Treaty.332 In its Centros decision, the ECJ held 
accordingly and left only the prevention of abuse and fraud to 
the EC Member States, the mere circumvention of law not con-
stituting either.333 Under these circumstances, public policy ar-
guments, which could theoretical ly justify an infringement of 
the right of establishment,334 will not prevail, especially since 
different solutions adopted by different Member States would 
increase the danger of discrimination. 
C. European Rules 
Thus, a solution can only be found at the European level.  
This has several important advantages.  First, it avoids the 
problem of discrimination by creating uniform rules that apply 
throughout Europe.  Second, it is very unlikely that the ECJ 
would find these rules of secondary European law to be in viola-
tion of the primary law right of establishment.  Third, it could 
significantly reduce remaining obstacles to the right of estab-
  
 330. As regards the Dutch statute, see the reference for preliminary ruling, 
Case C–410/99, Kantongerecht te Groningen, 2000 O.J. (C 20) 11. (This case 
became moot and was withdrawn because the pseudo-foreign corporation was 
struck off the company register in England. See Ebke, supra note 317, at 645.) 
See also Case C–167/01, Kantongerecht te Amsterdam, 2001 O.J. (C 200) 41; 
Ebke, supra note 317, at 646–48; Timmerman, supra note 317, at 185. As 
regards the Danish statute, see Hansen, supra note 322, at 152–57. 
 331. Supra notes 127, 142, 332, and 351. 
 332. See Wolfgang Schön, Der Rechtsmißbrauch im Europäischen Gesell-
schaftsrecht (forthcoming; on file with author). Cf. Ebke, supra note 317, at 
630. It can be argued, however, that compatibility with EC law depends on 
whether the state enacting an outreach statute follows the real seat or the 
place of incorporation theory. See Ebke, supra note 317, at 648. 
 333. Concerning the issue of abuse and fraud, compare Menjucq, supra note 
206, at 555–56; Sandrock, supra note 206, at 1343. 
 334. EC TREATY art. 46(1).  See Randelzhofer/Forsthoff, supra note 202, Rn. 
45–55. 
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lishment.  Fourth, it would provide corporations with more cer-
tainty and clarity as to the applicable law, reduce the risk of 
corporations being subjected to inconsistent rules and thus en-
able them to choose more comfortably the law that suits them 
best. 
1. Legislative Power of the EC 
When suggesting a solution at the European level the first 
question that arises is the legislative competence of the EC.  
Just like the federal government in the U.S., the EC has only 
the powers expressly granted to it by the EC Treaty.335 
Article 293 of the EC Treaty seems to reserve the issue of rec-
ognition of companies to negotiations between Member States.  
Yet, Advocate General Colomer points out that this does not 
prevent the ECJ from deciding these issues according to the 
fundamental freedoms.336 This makes it clear that Article 293 
does not exempt corporate choice of law from the scope of the 
EC Treaty.337 
Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam338 amended the EC 
Treaty and gives the EC the power of “promoting the compati-
bility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning 
the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction.”339 It has to be conceded, 
however, that the relevant provision is related to the free 
movement of persons and not to the right of establishment.  
Still, given the express mention of the rules on conflict of laws, 
the systematical position of the provision within the treaty 
seems of little significance.340 Also, the Council has, pursuant to 
  
 335. EC TREATY art. 5. 
 336. Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Case C–208/00, Überseering BV 
v. NCC Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (Dec. 4, 2001), 
¶ 34, Celex No. 600C0208. 
 337. The considerations of the Proposed Transfer of Corporate Domicile 
Directive, supra note 271, came to the same conclusion. 
 338. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN 
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997). 
 339. EC TREATY art. 65(b). 
 340. Sandrock, supra note 206, at 1339. See also Katharina Boele-Woelki, 
Unification and Harmonization of Private International Law in Europe, in 
PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 61, 62–66 (Jürgen Basedow et al. 
ed., 2000); Ebke, supra note 317, at 639; Erik Jayme & Christian Kohler, 
Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2000: Interlokales Privatrecht oder universelles 
Gemeinschaftsrecht?, IPRAX 6 (2000), 454 (454); Christian Kohler, Interroga-
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these provisions, already adopted the Brussels-I-Regulation, 
which contains provisions on corporations as well. 
A European solution could also be based on Article 44(2)(g) of 
the EC Treaty.  If this provision allows the coordination of “the 
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members 
and other, are required by Member States,”341 then a maiore ad 
minus it also allows for provisions that enable Member States 
to maintain certain safeguards against pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions.342 
Finally, Article 308 of the EC Treaty provides ‘backup powers’ 
in case the “Treaty has not provided the necessary powers” to 
attain “one of the objectives of the Community.”343   
Thus, according to one of the provisions cited above,344 the EC 
has the power to adopt a European solution to the question of 
the corporate choice of law.  Given the problems that this ques-
tion presents, there is little doubt that a European solution is 
“necessary for the proper functioning of the  internal market”345 
and does not violate the principle of subsidiarity.346  
2. Content of the suggested European rules 
So what should the European rules be?  A first attempt to 
find a European solution was made in 1968 when the then six 
Member States agreed, pursuant to Article 293 of the EC 
Treaty, on a Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Compa-
nies and Legal Entities [“1968 Convention”].347  However, this 
convention never entered into force because the Netherlands 
did not ratify it.348 The convention provided for the recognition 
  
tions sur les sources du droit international privé européen après le traité 
d’Amsterdam, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1999, 1, 16. 
 341. EC TREATY art. 44(2)(g). 
 342. The Proposed Transfer of Corporate Domicile Directive, supra note 
271, was also based on that provision. 
 343. EC TREATY art. 308. 
 344. The question of which provision of the treaty actually confers the power 
is significant only as to the further question of the procedure for adoption and 
the necessary majority, and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 345. See EC TREATY art. 65. 
 346. See id. art. 5(2). See the considerations of the Proposed Transfer of 
Corporate Domicile Directive, supra note 271. 
 347. Übereinkommen über die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Gesell-
schaften und Juristischen Personen, v. 29. 2. 1968, BGBl. II S.370 (1972) 
[hereinafter 1968 Convention].  
 348. See Grossfeld, supra note 193, Rn. 137. 
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of foreign corporations, but allowed each party to reserve the 
right to apply cogent forum law to foreign corporations that had 
their real seat in a state other than the state of incorporation.349 
With the 1968 Convention, the U.S. experience with outreach 
statutes, existing European legislation, and Sandrock’s super-
addition theory350 serving as guidelines, the European rules 
could be embodied in a European directive and take the follow-
ing form:  
1. Foreign corporations are recognized as legal entities, inde-
pendently of their real seat.  The law of the state of incorpor a-
tion applies to their internal affairs. 
2. As regards foreign corporations having their real seat in 
their territory, Member States have the right to: 
a) apply, mutatis mutandis, the SE-Directive on co-
determination’s rules in the case of an SE established by 
transformation to these corporations by either enacting 
special laws in accordance with that directive or applying 
the national laws enacted with respect to SEs; 
b) require the maintenance of a minimum capital not ex-
ceeding the amount stated in the Capital Directive 
(€25,000) and in accordance with the other provisions of 
the Capital Directive, and impose liability for non-
compliance. 
3. As regards foreign corporations having their real seat in 
their territory, Member States have, if these issues have not 
already been dealt with by European law, the right to enforce 
other public policies: 
a) for the benefit of third parties by applying these rules to 
the foreign corpor ation.  Each Member State will notify 
the Commission on what rules it will apply for the benefit 
of third parties and this notification will be published.  A 
  
 349. 1968 Convention, arts. 1, 4. All ratifying states exercised that right. 
Sandrock, supra note 206, at 1339. 
 350. The super-addition theory was already seen as a possible model for 
Europe by Bernhard Grossfeld & Thomas König, Identitätswahrende 
Sitzverlegung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, IPRAX 6 (1991), 380 (382); 
Bernhard Grossfeld & Thomas König, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, RIW 6 (1992), 433 (436). Cf. Barbara Höfling, 
Die Centros-Entscheidung des EuGH — auf dem Weg zu einer 
Überlagerungstheorie für Europa, DB 23 (1999), 1206. 
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Member State can only apply the rules as published after 
notification; 
b) for the benefit of shareholders by requiring the corpor a-
tion to disclose information pertinent to the different 
treatment of these public policy issues under the law ap-
plicable to the company.  A Member State may impose li-
ability on the corporation and its directors for non-
compliance if it has notified the commission on these rules 
and the notification has been published. 
4. Measures adopted by Member States as regards foreign cor-
porations having their real seat in their territory must be en-
forced in the other Member States, including the state of in-
corporation. 
5. A corporation has its real seat where the basic decisions of 
the board are effectively transformed into daily managerial 
and administrative decisions.  The corporation, its directors, or 
its shareholders who own directly or indirectly more than 10% 
of the shares have to register the real seat of the company 
with the competent authority according to the Branch Direc-
tive and according to the provisions of that directive.  The cor-
poration, its directors, and its shareholders who own directly 
or indirectly more than 10% of the shares are jointly and sev-
erally liable to any party for any damages resulting from cul-
pable (negligent or intentional) non -compliance. 
a) If the corporation has registered its real seat with a 
state, it is presumed that the real seat is located in that 
state.  If there is no registered real seat, it is presumed 
that the real seat is located in the state of incorporation.  
The presumption can be rebutted by any party, except for 
the corporation itself, its directors and its shareholders 
who own directly or indirectly more than 10% of the 
shares, in any proceeding involving the question of the lo-
cation of the real seat of the corporation. 
b) If, at the same time, different proceedings involve the 
question of the loc ation of the real seat of the corporation, 
each party is obliged to notify its respective court of the 
other proceedings.  Each court shall rule on the location of 
the real seat in an interim award.  If the rulings do not 
come to the same conclusion, each court shall stay its pr o-
ceedings and refer the question to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling.  Courts of non -Member 
states can request a preliminary ruling on the location of 
the real seat of a corporation by the courts of the Member 
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State in which the corporation is presumed to have its real 
seat. 
6. Member States must not treat the transfer of a domestic 
corporation’s real seat to another Member State as the disso-
lution of the corporation.  A Member State may, however, ap-
ply a procedure analogous to the procedure described in Arti-
cle 8 of the SE-Statute. 
3. Discussion 
These proposed rules seek to strike a balance between the 
necessary recognition of even pseudo-foreign corporations, the 
need to safeguard public policies of Member States, the objec-
tive of not subjecting foreign corporations to inconsistent rules, 
and giving founders and managers the opportunity to choose 
the law that suits them best.   
First, it is necessary to make clear that foreign corporations 
are to be recognized as legal entities in all Member States.  
Even though this cannot be inferred from Article 48 of the EC 
Treaty,351 the necessity nevertheless follows from the Centros 
case.  The application of the internal affairs rule will allow 
founders to choose the law that suits them best, and thus pro-
motes at least limited competition among Member States.  Its 
general application is also superior to the general application of 
the real seat theory.  Even if the real seat theory recognized 
pseudo-foreign corporations as legal entities, it would neverthe-
less have to re-qualify them as domestic corporations, which 
will lead to a variety of problems that can be avoided by choos-
ing the state of incorporation theory.   
Second, in order to avoid the disadvantages of the “pure” 
state of incorporation theory, it is necessary to make sure that 
Member States can enforce their public policies.  This Article 
has so far identified the questions of co-determination and 
minimum capital requirements as crucial in this respect.  The 
proposal tries to address these issues by enabling Member 
States to apply existing European legislation on these issues to 
  
 351. EC TREATY art. 48 is limited in scope and only treats companies as 
natural persons in as far as the right of establishment is concerned.  Cf. Ran-
delzhofer/Forsthoff, supra note 202, Rn. 1–2. Compare supra notes 127, 142, 
331, and 332. 
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pseudo-foreign corporations.352 A British Ltd. having its real 
seat in Germany can therefore be required to have and main-
tain a minimum capital and — no matter what its internal 
structure is353 — its employees will be entitled to some degree of 
co-determination, which will be set by a procedural mechanism 
pursuant to the SE-Directive.  The SE-Directive contains differ-
ent sets of rules for the different methods of formation of an SE; 
the proposal chooses the rules that apply in the case of an SE 
established by transformation because this case is closest to the 
case of a pseudo-foreign corporation, i.e., a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration can for this purpose be viewed as a domestic corpora-
tion that has transformed into a foreign one.354  This solution 
has the advantage of keeping the system coherent and of avoid-
ing re-negotiation of these issues.  Seen together with the gen-
eral recognition of foreign corporations and the adoption of the 
place of incorporation theory, this approach offers a fair trade-
off 355 — EC Member States will have to give up the real seat 
theory and will not receive full harmonization in return.  But 
this theory has been eroded by the ECJ’s jurisprudence anyway 
and they will at least be able to prevent the circumvention of 
their laws and their public policies.  Member States who ad-
hered to the place of incorporation theory will have to tolerate 
the exceptions to this theory that might go beyond the abuse 
and fraud exceptions recognized by Centros.  But, on the other 
hand, they receive recognition of all foreign corporations and 
certainty as to which rules apply to pseudo-foreign corporations.   
Third, the proposal also realizes that Member States might 
pursue other public policies apart from co-determination and 
  
 352. A roughly similar example of such a technique is Article 6 of the Single 
Member Directive.  Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 89/667/EEC of 21 
December 1989 on single-member private limited-liability companies, art. 6, 
1989 O.J. (L 395) 40, 41. 
 353. I.e., the choice of internal structure does not permit it to evade co-
determination.  See supra note 278. 
 354. In the case of an SE established by transformation, the default rule of 
the SE-Directive ensures that co-determination will not be diminished. See 
Heinze, supra note 278, at 90–91. In the case of a pseudo-foreign corporation 
this means, mutatis mutandis, that the level of co-determination will be equal 
to the level that applies to a comparable domestic corporation, unless the 
pseudo-foreign corporation reaches a different agreement with its employees. 
 355. It especially provides the clear separation between the recognition of 
the legal entity and the question which domestic rules can be applied to it 
required by Knobbe-Keuk, supra note 257, at 338. 
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minimum capital requirements (e.g., laws on groups of compa-
nies356) and enables them to enforce these policies unless Euro-
pean laws have already dealt with the issues.  In order to avoid 
too many exceptions to the general internal affairs rule, the 
proposal distinguishes between rules that benefit third parties 
(e.g., liability of the parent for the subsidiary in certain circum-
stances) and rules that benefit shareholders (e.g., minority pro-
tection, guaranteed dividends).  Rules that benefit third parties 
can be more strictly enforced because, on the one hand, third 
parties need and deserve more protection, and, on the other 
hand, these rules are less likely to interfere with the internal 
affairs of the corporation.  Since shareholders can protect them-
selves by not becoming shareholders, i.e., by not investing, it is 
less important to safeguard their interests.  Public policies can 
be enforced by simply informing (prospective) shareholders of 
the different legal rules that apply to a foreign corporation.  The 
notification and publication requirements seek to give the for-
eign corporation and its shareholders a clear idea of which legal 
regime applies and to protect them against surprise decisions. 
Fourth, even though state interests do not warrant the en-
forcement of third state interests, if the conflict of laws rules 
operate on the Member State level and are not uniform,357 this 
changes once they are transferred to the European level.  It is 
then necessary, in the interest of keeping the laws applicable to 
a corporation constant throughout the Community, that all EC 
Member States recognize and enforce rules applied to a foreign 
corporation by the state in which the corporation has its real 
seat.  Thus, German courts would have to apply the French 
laws enacted pursuant to this proposed directive to an Irish 
company having its real seat in France. 
Fifth, the proposal tries to facilitate the determination of 
where the “real seat” of the corporation is.  It therefore defines 
the term “real seat” in accordance with the real seat theory and 
does not adopt the approach of the Californian outreach statute.  
Even though a corporation cannot really be called pseudo-
foreign if it does business all over Europe and its shareholders 
are dispersed throughout the Community, the location of the 
real seat should be the only controlling factor.  First, the real 
  
 356. See Bundesgerichtshof, BB 22 (2000), 1106 (1107).  
 357. See supra Part V.D.1. 
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seat is already used as such in the EEIG-Regulation and the 
SE-Statute.358  Second, the corporation remains in control of the 
laws to apply to its internal affairs, and this important question 
does not depend on where the company’s securities are traded 
or on the development of its business activities.  Third, it is eas-
ier to determine where the real seat is located.  To facilitate this 
task further, the proposal provides for registration of the real 
seat according to the Branch Directive, which also implies dis-
closure, and publication according to the Disclosure Directive.  
For the same reason, the proposal establishes certain presump-
tions as to the location of the real seat and liability on the part 
of the corporation, directors, and 10% shareholders.  The proce-
dural rules try to avoid inconsistent decisions by courts and to 
ensure that the corporation not only has a real seat, but has 
only one real seat.359  It therefore also invites courts of non-EC 
Member States to refer questions on the location of the real seat 
of a foreign corporation to the courts of the EC Member State 
where the corporation is presumed to have its real seat for a 
preliminary ruling.360  In sum, these suggested rules make sure 
that the corporation is not subjected to inconsistent demands.   
Sixth, from the point of view of the Centros decision, it is suf-
ficient to ensure that foreign corporations can enter a host 
state.  According to Daily Mail, it is not necessary to enable 
them to leave their state of incorporation.361  Thus, Germany 
has to accept and to recognize a Centros Ltd. pseudo-foreign 
corporation entering Germany, but can deny a domestic Ger-
man corporation the right to transfer its (real) seat to Britain.362 
This distinction seems artificial and constitutes reverse dis-
crimination, i.e., discrimination against nationals as opposed to 
discrimination against foreign nationals.  Yet, the proposal does 
not aim to deal with the question of transfer of corporate domi-
cile in general.  It therefore leaves undecided the question of re-
incorporation (whether this involves the transfer of the real 
  
 358. See supra notes 286, 287. 
 359. Xanthaki, supra note 207, at 3. 
 360. A direct referral to the ECJ is not possible since Article 234 of the EC 
TREATY only enables the courts of Member States to request a preliminary 
ruling. 
 361. Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, [1988] E.C.R. 5483. 
 362. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, RIW 6 (2001), 463; Oberlandesgericht 
Hamm, RIW 6 (2001), 461. 
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seat or not363) and only allows domestic corporations to transfer 
their real seat to another Member State.  In the context of the 
state of incorporation theory, this cannot compromise any pub-
lic policy of the state of incorporation since its law continues to 
be applicable. 
Finally, the European solution should take the form of a di-
rective.  This facilitates the integration of the European rules 
into the legal systems of the EC Member States, i.e., gives the 
Member States the necessary freedom to adapt the rules to 
their (public policy) needs.  It therefore also minimizes interfer-
ence with the Member States’ legal systems and makes an 
agreement among the Member States more likely. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the U.S., the application of the place of incorporation the-
ory has lead to the Delaware Effect feared by many European 
commentators, but this has not adversely affected the U.S. 
economy.  However, before calling for a Delaware Effect for 
Europe, one should consider that, whereas the corporate laws in 
the U.S. are very similar so that adverse effects are necessarily 
limited, the stakes in Europe are higher.  They involve contro-
versial issues like maintenance of minimum capital and the 
highly political co-determination question, neither of which are 
an issue in the U.S. 
Both continents have developed functionally equivalent rules 
that deal with the questions presented by pseudo-foreign corpo-
rations.  Both in European and U.S. law, foreign corporations 
have to qualify and pseudo-foreign corporations are subjected to 
“outreach” by the laws of the host state.  In so far as the Euro-
pean outreach feature is based on the real seat theory, a new 
approach has become necessary due to the recent jurisprudence 
of the ECJ, strengthening the place of incorporation theory in 
Europe. 
This is not a cause for alarm, however.  The U.S. example 
shows that the place of incorporation theory still leaves room 
for appropriate exceptions, even in a federal system where the 
states are bound to take special regard of the position and laws 
  
 363. Therefore, a domestic corporation cannot become a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration by re-incorporating abroad and maintaining its real seat in the state 
of its original incorporation. 
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of other states and where discrimination is prohibited.  Europe 
simply has to be careful not to adopt a rigorous place of incorpo-
ration approach that does not allow exceptions designed to en-
force public policies in appropriate circumstances.  This danger 
is real given the Centros  case, in which the founders of a 
pseudo-foreign corporation openly admitted that they wanted to 
circumvent the Danish minimum capital requirement and the 
ECJ did not let the Danish authorities intervene.364  It has to be 
conceded, though, that the measures taken were disproportion-
ate and that the European Court of Justice might have found 
other, more proportionate, measures acceptable. 
The ECJ is confined to ruling case by case on violations of the 
fundamental freedoms and, accordingly, cannot create a legal 
system that balances EC Member State interests while at the 
same time safeguarding Community interests.  Such a system 
can and should be created only by the Community legislator 
who is called upon to act by the recent decisions of the ECJ.  
The proposed choice of corporate law directive avoids the dan-
gers of a too rigorous place of incorporation approach by com-
bining both theories.  The place of incorporation theory, being 
the general rule, is supplemented by selected features of the 
real seat theory that refer back to existing European legislation 
as much as possible. 
  
 364. Supra note 6. 
